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On the Epistemic Foundation for Iterated Weak
Dominance: An Analysis in a Logic of Individual
and Collective attitudes
Emiliano Lorini
Abstract This paper proposes a logical framework for representing static and
dynamic properties of different kinds of individual and collective attitudes. A com-
plete axiomatization as well as a decidability result for the logic are given. The logic
is applied to game theory by providing a formal analysis of the epistemic conditions
of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies (IDWDS), or iterated weak domi-
nance for short. The main difference between the analysis of the epistemic conditions
of iterated weak dominance given in this paper and other analysis is that we use a
semi-qualitative approach to uncertainty based on the notion of plausibility first intro-
duced by Spohn, whereas other analysis are based on a quantitative representation of
uncertainty in terms of probabilities.
Keywords Epistemic logic · Epistemic game theory · Belief revision · Iterated
weak dominance
1 Introduction
The fundamental concept of game theory is the concept of solution which is, at the
same time, a prescriptive notion, in the sense that it prescribes how rational agents in
a given interaction should play, and a predictive one, in the sense that it allows us to
predict how the agents will play. There exist many different solution concepts both
for games in normal form and for games in extensive form (e.g., Nash Equilibrium,
iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies, iterated deletion of weakly domi-
nated strategies, correlated equilibrium, backward induction, forward induction, etc.)
and new ones have been proposed in the recent years (see, e.g., [30]). A major issue
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we face when we want to use some solution concept in order either to predict human
behavior or to build some practical applications (e.g., for computer security or for
multi-agent systems) is to evaluate its significance. Some of the questions that arise
in these situations are, for instance: given certain assumptions about the agents such
as the assumption that they are rational (e.g., utility maximizers), under which con-
ditions will the agents converge to equilibrium? Are these conditions realistic? Are
they too strong for the domain of application under consideration? There is a branch
of game theory, called epistemic game theory, which can help to answer these ques-
tions (see [42] for a general introduction to the research in this area). Indeed, the aim
of epistemic game theory is to provide an analysis of the necessary and/or sufficient
epistemic conditions of the different solution concepts, that is, the assumptions about
the epistemic states of the players that are necessary and/or sufficient to ensure that
they will play according to the prescription of the solution concept. Typical epistemic
conditions which have been considered are, for example, the assumption that players
have common belief (or common knowledge) about the rationality of every player,1
the assumption that every player knows the choices of the others,2 or the assumption
that players are logically omniscient.3
The aim of this paper is to propose a new logic, called PDL-A (Propositional
Dynamic Logic of individual and collective Attitudes), in which the epistemic condi-
tions of different solution concepts for normal form games can be formally specified.
Our logic PDL-A is a combination of van Benthem et al.’s variant of Propositional
Dynamic Logic PDL which gives an epistemic interpretation to programs [53] with
Spohn’s theories of uncertainty and belief change [45]. The interesting aspect of this
logic is that it allows us to describe both the static and the dynamic properties of
different kinds of individual and collective epistemic attitudes such as knowledge,
belief, graded belief, robust belief and common belief which provide the epistemic
foundations of different solution concepts in game theory.
In this work we mainly concentrate on the logical characterization in PDL-A of the
epistemic conditions of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies (IDWDS)
(also called ‘iterated weak dominance’ or ‘iterated admissibility’).
Iterated weak dominance is an important solution concept in game theory which is
distinguished from iterated strong dominance. Although there have been some works
in economics investigating the epistemic conditions of iterated weak dominance, they
are far less studied and understood than the epistemic conditions of iterated strong
dominance. The fundamental difference between the analysis of iterated weak domi-
nance given in this paper and other analysis is that we use a semi-qualitative approach
to uncertainty based on the notion of plausibility introduced by Spohn [45], whereas
existing analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated weak dominance are based
on a quantitative representation of uncertainty in terms of probabilities (see, e.g.,
1This is the typical condition of iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies (also called iterated
strong dominance).
2This condition is required in order to ensure that the agents will converge to a Nash equilibrium.
3See [56] for an interesting analysis of iterated strong dominance after relaxing the assumption of logical
omniscience.
[20, 23, 32, 48]). Spohn’s theory of uncertainty and belief change, generally referred
to as ‘κ calculus’, has been largely used in Artificial Intelligence (AI) (Goldszmidt
& Pearl [28] refer to it as ‘rank-based system’ and ‘qualitative probabilities’). It pro-
vides an elegant and relatively simple approach designed to reason about both the
static aspects and the dynamic aspects of epistemic attitudes. Our approach is semi-
qualititative in the sense that we assume that beliefs of agents are ranked by a finite
number of non-negative integers providing a qualitative scale for degrees of belief.
Specifically, each integer corresponds to a linguistic quantifier such as I weakly
believe that ϕ, I mildly believe that ϕ, I strongly believe that ϕ, etc. However, our
approach is not purely qualitative because it allows us to say how much a given agent
believes that a certain proposition ϕ is true. The distinction between purely quan-
titative, semi-qualitative and purely qualitative approaches to uncertainty has been
widely discussed in the AI literature (see, e.g., [41, 55]). While in purely quantita-
tive approaches belief states are characterized by classical probabilistic measures or
by alternative numerical accounts, such as lexicographic probabilities [14, 20, 23] or
conditional probabilities [12], in semi-qualitative approaches, such as Spohn’s the-
ory, belief states are described by rough qualitative measures assigning orders of
magnitude. Finally, purely qualitative approaches do not use any numerical represen-
tation of uncertainty but simply a plausibility ordering on possible worlds structures
inducing an epistemic-entrenchment-like ordering on propositions. Purely qualitative
approaches have been used both in the area of belief revision and in the area of logics
of belief change (see, e.g., [9, 27, 51]).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an informal intro-
duction to the concept of iterated weak dominance and to the epistemic conditions
of this solution concept. Section 3 presents the syntax and the semantics of the logic
PDL-A. Section 4 is devoted to the formalization in PDL-A of the previous different
kinds of individual and collective attitudes, which are fundamental building blocks
for the analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated weak dominance. In Section
5 a complete axiomatization as well as a decidability result for PDL-A are given. In
Section 6 the logic PDL-A is extended with constructions to describe information
about agents’ choices and is used to provide an analysis of the epistemic conditions of
iterated weak dominance. Related works on the analysis of the epistemic conditions
of iterated weak dominance are discussed in Section 7.
2 Epistemic Conditions of Iterated Weak Dominance: Some Intuitions
Given a game in normal form Ŵ and a player i in this game, a strategy a of player i is
a weakly dominated strategy if and only if there is another strategy b of player i such
that: (1) no matter what strategies the other players will choose, playing b is for i at
least as good as playing a and (2) there exists at least one strategy profile of the other
players such that, if the others play this strategy then playing b is for player i better
than playing a. The so-called iterated weak dominance is a procedure that starts with
a given game in normal form and, at each step, for every player in the game removes
all his weakly dominated strategies, thereby generating a subgame of the original
game, and that repeats this process again and again. The strategy profiles that survive
Fig. 1 Example of iterated
deletion of weakly dominated
strategies
after this iteration of removal of weakly dominated strategies are the equilibria of the
game.
Consider the game in Fig. 1 with two players Row and Column (the payoff on the
left-hand side being the payoff of Row and the payoff on the right-hand side being
the payoff of Column). In the initial game the strategy B of Row is weakly dominated
by the strategy A and is deleted from the game. In the resulting game the strategy β
of Column is weakly dominated by the strategy α and is also deleted from the game.
Therefore, the solution of the game is the strategy profile (A, α).
There are at least two requirements that should be met in order to be able to predict
that the players will act according to the prediction of iterated weak dominance. Let
us illustrate them with the aid of the example in Fig. 1. Assume that both Row and
Column are rational players (i.e., they are utility maximizers) and that they have a
common belief about this.
If we assume that Row is rational then his only reason for discarding strategy B
and for deciding not to play it is that he envisages the possibility that Column will
play β (even though playing β clashes with the hypothesis that Column is rational and
that she believes that Row is rational, as we assumed common belief in rationality,
and hence that Row will not play B). Thus, the first requirement is that the beliefs of
Row and, more generally, the beliefs of every player in the game must be cautious,
in the sense that every player must envisage all possible choices of the other players
(see, e.g., [38, Chapter 8] and also [2, 4, 18, 19, 22, 44] for further discussion about
this requirement).
Moreover, if we assume that Column is rational then her reason for discarding
strategy β is that she considers the situation in which Row plays the admissible (i.e.,
non-weakly dominated) strategy A strictly more plausible than the situation in which
Row plays the inadmissible strategy B. More generally, in order to guarantee that
the players in a game will act according to the prescription of the solution concept,
each of them should believe that the situations in which the other players play an
admissible strategy are strictly more plausible than the situations in which they play
an inadmissible one. If we assume that a certain strategy of a player is incompatible
with the player’s rationality if and only if it is inadmissible, the previous observation
leads to the following second requirement: every player in a game must have a robust
belief about the rationality of the other players, in the sense that he will continue
to believe that the others will play rationally as long as he does not learn something
which is incompatible with this fact. This concept of ‘robust belief’ is one of the
key elements of Stalnaker’s analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated weak
dominance [47, 48].4
4Related concepts are the concept of ‘assumption’ [23], ‘strong belief’ [12] and ‘full belief’ [2]. See [3]
for a comparative analysis of these four concepts.
The previous two requirements will be formally specified in Section 6, in which
a logical analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated weak dominance will be
provided. But before moving to game theory we present in the next section the logic
PDL-A.
3 Logical Framework
This section presents the syntax and the semantics of the logic PDL-A. Technically,
this logic is an extension of the logic E-PDL (Epistemic Propositional Dynamic
Logic) proposed by van Benthem et al. [53] with special constructions for repre-
senting plausibility orderings over possible worlds and with dynamic operators for
representing the effects of an operation of belief conditioning in the sense of Spohn.
Generally speaking, PDL-A can be seen as a combination of E-PDL with Spohn’s
rank-based system.
3.1 Syntax
Assume a countable set of atomic propositions describing facts Prop = {p, q, . . .}, a
finite set of agents Agt = {i, j, . . .} and a set of natural numbers Num = {0, . . . ,max},
with max ∈ N \ {0}. For example, suppose Num = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. Num can be
interpreted as a qualitative scale where 0 means ‘null’, 1 means ‘very low’, 2 means
‘low’, 3 means ‘medium’, 4 means ‘high’ and 5 means ‘very high’.5 For the sake of
simplicity we assume that Num is finite. This assumption is crucial to be able to pro-
vide a complete axiomatization of the logic PDL-A (see Section 5). A generalization
of our results to the case where Num is infinite is postponed to future work.
2Agt∗ = 2Agt \ ∅ is the set of all non-empty sets of agents (alias coalitions).
Elements of 2Agt∗ are denoted by symbols J,H, . . . For notational convenience, the
coalition Agt \ {i} is denoted by −i.
The language of PDL-A is defined by the following grammar in Backus-Naur Form
(BNF):
π ::= i | π1;π2 | π1 ∪ π2 | π∗ |?ϕ
ϕ,ψ ::= p | exci,h | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | [π ]ϕ | [∗αi ϕ]ψ
where p ranges over Prop, h ranges over Num, i ranges over Agt and α ranges over
Num \ {0}. The other Boolean constructions ⊤, ⊥, ∨, → and ↔ are defined from p,
¬ and ∧ in the standard way. We define Obj to be the set of all Boolean combinations
of atomic propositions in Prop and we call the elements of Obj ontic (or objective)
facts in order to distinguish them from ‘epistemic facts’ about agents’ mental states.
5It has to be noted that Spohn’s notion of plausibility is measured on the set of ordinals. Here, for
simplicity, it is assumed that plausibility is measured on the integer scale Num.
Knowledge constructs (or programs) π correspond to the basic constructions
of Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) [33]: sequential composition (;), non-
deterministic choice (∪), iteration (∗) and test (?). A given knowledge program π
corresponds to a specific configuration of the agents’ epistemic states.
The formula [π ]ϕ has to be read “ϕ is true, according to the knowledge program
π”. For the atomic case, the operator [i] represents the standard S5-notion, partition-
based and fully introspective notion of knowledge that is commonly used both in
computer science [26] and economics [6]. [i]ϕ has to be read “ϕ is true according to
what agent i knows” or more simply “agent i knows that ϕ is true”, which just means
that “ϕ is true in all worlds that agent i envisages”. Sequential composition ; allows
to represent an agent’s knowledge over his knowledge and over other agents’ knowl-
edge. For instance, [i; j]ϕ means that “ϕ is true according to what agent i knows
about agent j’s knowledge”. or more simply “agent i knows that agent j knows that ϕ
is true”. Non-deterministic choice ∪ allows to represent the notion of shared knowl-
edge. For instance, [i ∪ j]ϕ means that “both agent i and agent j know that ϕ is true”.
By means of iteration ∗ one can represent higher order knowledge of arbitrary depth.
For instance, [(i; j)∗]ϕ means that “agent i knows that agent j knows ϕ is true, agent
i knows that agent j knows that agent i knows that agent j knows ϕ is true, and so on,
ad infinitum”. The test operation ? has the usual meaning as in PDL: [?ϕ]ψ means
that “if ϕ is true then ψ is true”.
As we will show in Section 4.1, the operators [i] captures a form of ‘absolutely
unrevisable belief’, that is, a form of belief which is stable under belief revision
with any new evidence. A similar property for the notion of knowledge has been
advanced by the so-called defeasibility (or stability) theory of knowledge [34, 43,
49]. According to this theory, a given piece of information ϕ is part of an agent’s
knowledge only if the agent’s justification to believe that ϕ is true is sufficiently
strong that it is not capable of being defeated by evidence that the agent does not
possess. As pointed out by [9], two different interpretations of the term ‘evidence’
have been given in the context of this theory, each giving a different interpretation of
what knowledge is. The first one [49] defines knowledge as a form of belief which
is stable under belief revision with ‘any piece of true information’, while the second
one [43] gives a stronger definition of knowledge as a form of belief which is stable
under belief revision with ‘any piece of information’. The concept formalized by the
operators [i] captures the latter notion of knowledge in a stronger sense. In Section
4.1, we will introduce the notion of safe belief which corresponds to the former notion
of knowledge.
The formula
[
∗αi ϕ
]
ψ has to be read “after agent i has learnt that ϕ is true with a
degree of firmness α, ψ will be true” (or “after agent i has revised his beliefs with ϕ
and with a degree of firmness α, ψ will be true”). As we will show in Section 3.2,
technically an epistemic event ∗αi ϕ amounts to an operation of beliefs’ conditional-
ization in Spohn’s sense [45], where the parameter α measures the extent to which
agent i will believe that ϕ is true after learning that ϕ is true. The epistemic event
∗αi ϕ is supposed to be public, i.e., if agent i learns that ϕ is true then all other agents
know this. This assumption could be easily relaxed by using action models as intro-
duced in [7, 8], which would allow us to model private and semi-private epistemic
events.
The language of PDL-A contains special atoms of the form exci,h which are used
to rank the worlds that agent i considers possible at a given world according to their
plausibility degree for the agent. Starting from [29], ranking among possible worlds
have been extensively used in belief revision theory. We here use the notion of plau-
sibility first introduced by Spohn [45]. Following Spohn’s theory, the worlds that are
assigned the smallest numbers are the most plausible, according to the beliefs of the
individual. That is, the number h assigned to a given world rather captures the degree
of exceptionality of this world, where the exceptionality degree of a world is nothing
but the opposite of its plausibility degree (i.e., the exceptionality degree of a world
decreases when its plausibility degree increases). Therefore, formula exci,h can be
read alternatively as “the current world has for agent i a degree of exceptionality equal
to h” or “the current world has for agent i a degree of plausibility equal to max− h”.
Before turning into semantics, we provide some abbreviations that will be used in
the rest of the paper. We define 〈i〉 to be the dual of [i], that is:
〈i〉ϕ def= ¬[i]¬ϕ
Formula 〈i〉ϕ means that “ϕ is compatible with agent i’s knowledge”.
3.2 Semantics
The semantics of the logic PDL-A is a possible world semantics with a special
function for exceptionality.
Definition 1 (Model) PDL-A models are tuples M = 〈W, {Ei : i ∈ Agt}, κ,V 〉
where:
• W is a nonempty set of possible worlds or states;
• every Ei is an equivalence relation between worlds in W;
• κ : W × Agt −→ Num is a total function mapping worlds and agents to natural
numbers in Num such that:
(Constr1) for every w ∈ W and for every i ∈ Agt, there is v such that wEiv and
κ(v, i) = 0;
• V : W −→ 2Prop is a valuation function.
As usual, p ∈ V (w) means that proposition p is true at world w. The equivalence
relations E i, which are used to interpret the epistemic operators [i], can be viewed as
functions from W to 2W . Therefore, we can write Ei(w) = {v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Ei}.
The set Ei(w) is agent i’s information set at world w: the set of worlds that agent i
envisages at world w. As Ei is an equivalence relation, if (w, v) ∈ Ei then agent i has
the same information set at w and v (i.e., agent i has the same knowledge at w and v).
The function κ provides a plausibility grading of the possible worlds for each agent
i and is used to interpret the atomic formulas exci,h. κ(w, i) = hmeans that, according
to agent i the world w has a degree of exceptionality h or, alternatively, according to
agent i the world w has a degree of plausibility max− h. (Remember that the degree
of plausibility of a world for an agent is the opposite of its exceptionality degree for
the agent). The function κ allows to rank an agent’s envisaged worlds according to
their plausibility degree: among the worlds agent i envisages at world w (i.e., agent i’s
information set at w), there are worlds that i considers more plausible than others. For
example, suppose that Ei(w) = {w, v, u}, κ(w, i) = 2, κ(u, i) = 1 and κ(v, i) = 0.
This means that at world w agent i envisages the three worlds w, v and u. Moreover,
according to agent i, the world v is strictly more plausible than the world u and the
world u is strictly more plausible than the world w (as max−0 > max−1 > max−2).
(Constr1) is a normality constraint for the plausibility grading which ensures that
an agent can always envisage a world with a minimal degree of exceptionality 0. This
constraint is important because it ensures that an agent’s beliefs are consistent e.g.,
an agent cannot believe ϕ and ¬ϕ at the same time (see Section 4.1 for more details).
As in PDL, the accessibility relation for atomic knowledge programs is general-
ized to all kinds of knowledge programs. Given a PDL-A-model M = 〈W, {Ei : i ∈
Agt}, κ,V 〉 we define:
Eπ1;π2 = Eπ1 ◦ Eπ2
Eπ1∪π2 = Eπ1 ∪ Eπ2
Eπ∗ = (Eπ )
∗
E?ϕ = {(w,w) : w ∈ ||ϕ||}
where ||ϕ|| = {w ∈ W : M,w |= ϕ}.
Definition 2 (Truth conditions) Given a PDL-A-model M, a world w and a formula
ϕ, M,w |= ϕ means that ϕ is true at world w in M. The rules defining the truth
conditions of formulas are:
• M,w |= p iff p ∈ V (w)
• M,w |= exci,h iff κ(w, i) = h
• M,w |= ¬ϕ iff not M,w |= ϕ
• M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
• M,w |= [π ]ϕ iff M, v |= ϕ for all v such that (w, v) ∈ Eπ
• M,w |= [∗αi ϕ]ψ iff M∗
α
i ϕ,w |= ψ
where the updated model M∗αi ϕ is defined according to the Definition 4 below.
The epistemic event ∗αi ϕ (i.e., agent i learns that ϕ is true) updates agent i’s infor-
mation set by modifying the exceptionality degree that i ascribes to his envisaged
worlds. Before defining this model update, we follow [45] and lift the exceptionality
of a possible world to the exceptionality of a formula viewed as a set of worlds.
Definition 3 (Exceptionality degree of a formula) Given a PDL-A model M =
〈W, {Ei : i ∈ Agt}, κ,V 〉, let ||ϕ||w,i = {v ∈ W : v ∈ ||ϕ|| and (w, v) ∈ Ei} be the
set of worlds that agent i envisages at w and in which ϕ is true. The exceptionality
degree of formula ϕ for agent i at world w, denoted by κw,i(ϕ), is defined as follows:
κw,i(ϕ) =
{
min
v∈||ϕ||w,i
κ(v, i) if ||ϕ||w,i = ∅
max if ||ϕ||w,i = ∅
The exceptionality degree of a formula ϕ captures the extent to which ϕ is consid-
ered to be exceptional by the agent. As expected, the plausibility degree of a formula
ϕ is defined as max − κw,i(ϕ). The plausibility degree of a formula ϕ captures the
extent to which ϕ is considered to be plausible by the agent.
Definition 4 (Update) Given a PDL-A-model M = 〈W, E, κ,V 〉, M∗αi ϕ is the model
such that for all w ∈ W and for all j ∈ Agt:
W∗
α
i ϕ = W
E
∗αi ϕ
j = Ej
κ∗
α
i ϕ(w, i) =
⎧⎨⎩ κ(w, i)− κw,i(ϕ) if M,w |= ϕCut(α + κ(w, i)− κw,i(¬ϕ)) if M,w |= ¬ϕ ∧ 〈i〉ϕ
κ(w, i) if M,w |= [i]¬ϕ
κ∗
α
i ϕ(w, j) = κ(w, j) if i = j
V ∗
α
i ϕ = V
where
Cut(x) =
{
x if 0 ≤ x ≤ max
max if x > max
The epistemic event ∗αi ϕ does not affect the objective world. This is the reason
why the valuation function V is not altered by it (see the definition of V ∗αi ϕ). More-
over, it modifies agent i’s plausibility ordering but does not modify the plausibility
orderings of the agents different from i (see the definition of κ∗αi ϕ). In particular, it
induces a kind of belief conditioning in Spohn’s sense [45]. Agent i’s plausibility
ranking over his envisaged worlds is updated as follows.
1. For every world w in which ϕ is true, i.e., M,w |= ϕ, the degree of exceptionality
of w for i decreases from κ(w, i) to κ(w, i) − κw,i(ϕ), which is the same thing
as saying that, degree of plausibility of w for i increases from max − κ(w, i) to
max−(κ(w, i)−κw,i(ϕ)). (Note that, by Definition 3, we have κ(w, i)−κw,i(ϕ) ≤
κ(w, i)).
2. For every world w in which ϕ is false:
(a) if at w agent i envisages a world in which ϕ is true, i.e., M,w |= ¬ϕ ∧
〈i〉ϕ, then the degree of exceptionality of w for i changes from κ(w, i)
to Cut(α + κ(w, i)− κw,i(¬ϕ));
(b) if at w agent i does not envisage a world in which ϕ is true, i.e. M,w |=
[i]¬ϕ, then the degree of exceptionality of w for i does not change.
The preceding condition 1 ensures the intuitive requirement that belief revision with
ϕ leaves the plausibility ranking in the ϕ-part of agent i’s information set unchanged.
In other words, if v and u are worlds in which ϕ is true and agent i considers v more
plausible (or less exceptional) than u then, after revising his beliefs with ϕ, agent
i will still consider v more plausible than u. More formally, for all v, u ∈ ||ϕ|| we
have that if κ(u, i) > κ(v, i) and (u, v) ∈ Ei then κ∗
α
i ϕ(u, i) > κ∗αi ϕ(v, i).6 The
degree of firmness α in the preceding condition 2(a) measures the extent to which
agent i will believe that ϕ is true after revising his beliefs with ϕ. Indeed, as we will
show in Section 4.1, in Spohn’s theory of uncertainty the strength of the belief that
ϕ is true is defined by the exceptionality degree of the negation of ϕ (i.e., κw,i(¬ϕ)).
Consequently, condition 2(a) guarantees that, if agent i envisages a world in which
an objective formula ϕ is true then, after revising his beliefs with formula ϕ and with
a degree of firmness α, he will believe ϕ with strength α. This property will become
clearer in Section 4.1 in which the concept of graded belief (i.e., believing something
with a certain strength) will be formally defined and its logical properties will be
studied (see, in particular, Proposition 7).
Note that the reason why in Section 3.1 we assumed that α must be different from
0 is to guarantee that if an agent envisages a world in which a given objective formula
ϕ is true then, after learning that ϕ is true, he will believe ϕ. Again, this property of
the belief revision operation will become clearer in Section 4.1 where the concept of
belief will be clearly defined (see, again, Proposition 7).
The function Cut is a minor technical device, taken from [5], which ensures
that the new plausibility assignment fits into the finite set of natural numbers Num.
Finally, the preceding condition 2(b) guarantees that the agent’s i plausibility ordering
over worlds does not change, if i learns something that he does not envisage.7
Remark 1 It is straightforward to verify that the operation ∗αi ϕ preserves the con-
straint (Constr1) over PDL-A-models. Therefore, if M is a PDL-A-model then M∗αi ϕ
is a PDL-A-model too.
In what follows we write |= ϕ to mean that ϕ is valid (ϕ is true in all PDL-A-
models).
4 Varieties of Individual and Collective Attitudes
In the following two sections a variety of individual and collective attitudes will be
defined, and their logical properties and logical relationships will be studied. We
consider three kinds of individual attitudes, in addition to the concept of knowl-
edge formalized by the operator [i], namely belief, graded belief and robust belief.
Furthermore, we consider three kinds of collective attitudes, namely common knowl-
edge, common belief and common robust belief. Of course, we do not claim that this
analysis is exhaustive. For instance, we do not consider the collective counterpart of
6As for the ¬ϕ-part, due to the fact that Num is finite, we can only say that: if v and u are worlds in
which ϕ is false, agent i considers v more plausible than u and, according to agent i, u has a degree of
exceptionality equal or lower than max−α then, after revising his beliefs with ϕ, agent i will still consider
v more plausible than u. More formally, for all v, u ∈ ||¬ϕ||we have that if κ(u, i) > κ(v, i) and (u, v) ∈ Ei
and κ(u, i) ≤ max− α then κ∗αi ϕ(u, i) > κ∗αi ϕ(v, i).
7Note that the three conditions 1, 2(a) and 2(b) cover all cases. Indeed, the third condition [i]¬ϕ is
equivalent to ¬ϕ ∧ [i]¬ϕ, because [i]¬ϕ → ¬ϕ is valid.
graded belief, namely the concept common graded belief, as a logical analysis of this
concept goes beyond the objectives of the present work.
The concepts of belief, graded belief, robust belief and common belief will be
fundamental building blocks for the analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated
weak dominance that we will carry out in Section 6. The concept of graded belief
is also essential to understand the meaning of the parameter α in the belief revision
operator
[
∗αi ϕ
]). Finally, the concepts of common knowledge and common robust
belief are defined here because we are interested: (1) in comparing them with the con-
cept of common belief and (2) in understanding the similarities between the dynamic
properties of robust belief and the dynamic properties of common robust belief, and
between the dynamic properties of knowledge and the dynamic properties of common
knowledge.
4.1 Individual Attitudes
Following [45], we say that agent i believes that ϕ is true, denoted by Beliϕ, if and
only if ϕ is true in all worlds that i considers minimally exceptional (or maximally
plausible). Let us define the belief operator Beli as follows:
Beliϕ
def
= [i](exci,0 → ϕ)
As the following Proposition 1 highlights, the previous abbreviation correctly charac-
terizes this notion of belief. Given a PDL-A model M = 〈W, {Ei : i ∈ Agt}, κ,V 〉 and
a world w in M, let Bi = {(w, v) : (w, v) ∈ Ei and κ(v, i) = 0} be the accessibility
relation for agent i’s belief and Bi(w) = {v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ Bi} be the corresponding
i’s belief state at world w.
Proposition 1 For every PDL-A model M and for every world w in M, M,w |= Beliϕ
if and only if M, v |= ϕ for all v ∈ Bi(w).
The following concept of ‘graded belief’ is taken from Spohn.8 We say that at
world w agent i believes that ϕ with strength equal to h, denoted by Belhi ϕ, if and only
if the degree of exceptionality of ¬ϕ for agent i at w (i.e., κw,i(¬ϕ)) is equal to h. In
formal terms we define:
Belhi ϕ
def
=
{
〈i〉(exci,h ∧ ¬ϕ) ∧ [i](exci,<h → ϕ) if h < max
[i](exci,<h → ϕ) if h = max
8A modal logic analysis of this concept has been given by Aucher [5] (see also [35, 54]). A relevant
difference between Aucher’s approach and our approach is that he introduces graded belief operators in
the syntax right away, whereas we build them from the special atomic formulae exci,h. However, the added
value of working with the exci,h-constructs is that they provide a simple extension of van Benthem et al.’s
logic presented in [53]. This simple extension allows us to formalize a variety of individual and collective
epistemic attitudes that have been studied in the literature (see Section 4) and that are not expressible in
Aucher’s logic. (For instance, Aucher’s logic does not incorporate the concepts of common belief and
common knowledge).
where exci,<h
def
=
∨
k∈Num:0≤k<h exci,k for all h ∈ Num such that h ≥ 1, and
exci,<0
def
= ⊥. The following proposition highlights that the preceding definition of
the graded belief operator is indeed correct.
Proposition 2 For every PDL-A model M, for every world w in M and for every
h ∈ Num, M,w |= Belhi ϕ if and only if κw,i(¬ϕ) = h.
As we have emphasized above, graded belief is a fundamental concept of Spohn’s
theory of uncertainty and belief change, as it justifies the definition of belief revision
we have given in Section 3.2 (Definition 4). It is worth noting that the graded belief
operator Belhi is an operator of strong necessity (or actual necessity) in the sense of
possibility theory [25].
For every h ∈ Num, we moreover provide the following definition:
Bel
≥h
i ϕ
def
=
∨
k∈Num:k≥h
Belki ϕ
Bel
≥h
i ϕ has to be read “agent believes that ϕ is true with strength at least h”. It is
worth noting that, when h ≥ 1, the operator Bel≥hi is a normal operator, as it can be
interpreted by means of the following accessibility relation:
B<hi = {(w, v) : (w, v) ∈ Ei and κ(v, i) < h}.
In particular, given a PDL-A model M = 〈W, {Ei : i ∈ Agt}, κ,V 〉, we have that
M,w |= Bel≥hi ϕ if and only if M, v |= ϕ for all v such that (w, v) ∈ B<hi . The
operator Bel≥hi will be a key element in the analysis of the epistemic conditions of
iterated weak dominance that we will conduct in Section 6.4. Specifically, it will be
necessary in order to define the notion of perfect rationality on which the concept of
iterated weak dominance is based. For notational convenience, we define B̂el≥hi to be
the dual operator of Bel≥hi , that is, B̂el
≥h
i ϕ
def
= ¬Bel
≥h
i ¬ϕ.
The following Propositions 3–7 capture some interesting properties of the preced-
ing types of individual attitudes. For instance, the following Proposition 3 highlights
that modal operators for belief and graded belief with strength at least h are
normal.
Proposition 3 For every  ∈ {Beli : i ∈ Agt}∪
{
Bel
≥h
i : i ∈ Agt, h ∈ Num \ {0}
}
we
have:
|= (ϕ ∧ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ) (1a)
If |= ϕ then |= ϕ (1b)
According to the following Proposition 4, belief is characterized by the normal
modal logic system KD45.
Proposition 4 For every i ∈ Agt we have:
|= ¬(Beliϕ ∧ Beli¬ϕ) (2a)
|= Beliϕ → BeliBeliϕ (2b)
|= ¬Beliϕ → Beli¬Beliϕ (2c)
Note that the item (2a) follows from the normality constraint (Constr1) over PDL-A
models given in Section 3.2.
The following Proposition 5 highlights some basic relationships between knowl-
edge, belief and graded beliefs with different strengths.
Proposition 5 For every i ∈ Agt we have:
|= Belhi ϕ → ¬Bel
k
i ϕ if h = k (3a)
|= [i]ϕ → Belmaxi ϕ (3b)
|= [i]ϕ → Beliϕ (3c)
|= Beliϕ ↔ Bel
≥1
i ϕ (3d)
According to the item (3a), an agent cannot believe the same thing with different
strengths. Moreover, knowing that ϕ implies believing that ϕ with maximal strength
max (3b); knowing that ϕ implies believing that ϕ (3c); believing that ϕ coincides
believing that ϕ with strength at least 1 (3d).
The following Proposition 6 captures the basic decomposability properties of the
operators of graded belief.
Proposition 6 For every i ∈ Agt we have:
|=
(
Belhi ϕ ∧ Bel
k
iψ
)
→ Bel
≥max{h,k}
i (ϕ ∨ ψ) (4a)
|=
(
Belhi ϕ ∧ Bel
k
iψ
)
→ Bel
min{h,k}
i (ϕ ∧ ψ) (4b)
According to the validity (4a), the degree of belief of ϕ∨ψ is at least equal to the max-
imum of the degree of belief of ϕ and ψ . According to the validity (4b), the degree
of belief of ϕ ∧ ψ is equal to the minimum of the degree of belief of ϕ and ψ . Simi-
lar properties for graded belief are given in possibility theory [25]. Note that second
validity uses the “definite” value min{h, k} while the first validity uses the “at least”
construction≥ max{h, k} because the minimun of the union of two sets is equal to the
minimum of the minima of the two sets, while the minimun of the intersection of two
sets is at least equal to the maximum of the minima of the two sets but not necessarily
equal.
Finally, the following Proposition 7 is about the dynamic properties of belief and
graded belief.
Proposition 7 For every i ∈ Agt and for every α ∈ Num \ {0} we have:
|= 〈i〉ϕ →
[
∗αi ϕ
]
Beliϕ if ϕ ∈ Obj (5a)
|= 〈i〉ϕ →
[
∗αi ϕ
]
Belαi ϕ if ϕ ∈ Obj (5b)
|= [i]ψ →
[
∗αi ϕ
]
[i]ψ if ψ ∈ Obj (5c)
|=
[
∗αi ϕ
]
[i]ψ → [i]ψ if ψ ∈ Obj (5d)
Item (5a) highlights a basic property of belief revision in the sense of AGM theory
[1], namely the so-called success postulate: if ϕ is an objective fact and agent i envis-
ages a world in which ϕ is true then, after learning that ϕ is true, agent i believes that
ϕ is true.9 Note that this property does not hold in general but only for formulas in
Obj. Indeed, if we drop the restriction to Boolean formulas, the match to AGM suc-
cess postulate does not work anymore. For instance, if ϕ is a Moore-like sentence of
the form p ∧ ¬Belip, the formula 〈i〉ϕ →
[
∗αi ϕ
]
Beliϕ is clearly not valid.
Item (5b) clarifies the role of the degree of firmness α in the operation of belief
revision: if ϕ is an objective fact and agent i envisages a world in which ϕ is true
then, after revising his beliefs with formula ϕ and with a degree of firmness α, agent
i believes that ϕ is true with strength equal to α. Finally, item (5c) captures the fun-
damental property of knowledge that we have discussed in Section 3.1: if ψ is an
objective fact and agent i knows that ψ then, after learning a new fact ϕ, he will
continue to know that ψ is true. In this sense, knowledge is stable under belief revi-
sion with any piece of information. The last item (5d) is a no-learning principle for
knowledge: if ψ is an objective fact and agent i will know that ψ after revising his
knowledge with ϕ then, it means that i already knows ψ .
Before moving to the analysis of collective attitudes, we follow Stalnaker [48] in
defining a notion of robust belief relative to a specific formula ϕ, in the sense of
belief which is stable under belief revision with ϕ:
RBeli(ϕ, ψ)
def
= Beliψ ∧
[
∗αi ϕ
]
Beliψ
where α is any arbitrary value in Num \ {0} (e.g., α = 1). The construction
RBeli(ϕ, ψ) has to be read “agent i has a robust belief that ψ relative to ϕ”. One
reason why the value of the parameter α can be taken arbitrarily is that we have the
following validity, for all α, α′ ∈ Num \ {0} and for all ψ ∈ Obj:
|=
[
∗αi ϕ
]
Beliψ ↔
[
∗α
′
i ϕ
]
Beliψ
Therefore, the definition of relative robust belief RBeli(ϕ, ψ) is independent
from the value of α in case of objective formulas (i.e., Beliψ ∧
[
∗αi ϕ
]
Beliψ
is logically equivalent to Beliψ ∧
[
∗α
′
i ϕ
]
Beliψ for all α, α′ ∈ Num \ {0}
and for all ψ ∈ Obj). This concept of relative robust belief, as well as
the concept of graded belief defined above, will be fundamental in the logical
9The only difference with AGM theory is the condition 〈i〉ϕ. AGM assumes that the new information ϕ
must incorporated in the belief base, whereas we here assume that ϕ must incorporated in the belief base
only if agent i envisages a world in which ϕ is true.
analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated weak dominance we will carry out in
Section 6.
Remark 2 It is worth noting that our concept of relative robust belief, represented
by the formula RBeli(ϕ, ψ), is related to the concept of robust (or strong) belief
defined by [10]. According to Baltag & Smets, ϕ is a strong belief if and only if ϕ
is epistemically possible and moreover all epistemically possible ϕ-states are strictly
more plausible than all epistemically possible ¬ϕ-states. More formally, we can say
that at world w agent i has the robust belief that ψ (in Baltag & Smets’s sense),
denoted by RBelB&Si ψ , if and only if (i) ||ψ ||w,i = ∅ and (ii) for all v ∈ ||ψ ||w,i and
for all u ∈ ||¬ψ ||w,i, κ(v, i) < κ(u, i). The operator RBelB&Si ψ can be syntactically
expressed in the logic PDL-A. In particular, for every PDL-A model M and for all
w ∈ W we have:
M,w |= RBelB&Si ψ if and only if
M,w |= Beliψ ∧
∧
h∈Num\{0}
(〈i〉(¬ψ ∧ exci,h)→ [i](ψ → exci,<h)).
Note that for all objective facts ψ ∈ Obj, we have the following validity:
|=
(
RBelB&Si ψ ∧ 〈i〉(ϕ ∧ ψ)
)
→ RBeli(ϕ,ψ).
In other words, if ψ is robust belief in Baltag & Smets’s sense and, according to the
agent’s knowledge, ϕ and ψ are consistent, then the agent has a robust belief that ψ
relative to ϕ, that is, the belief that ψ is stable under belief revision with ϕ. In other
words, a robust belief in Baltag & Smets’s sense can only be defeated by evidence
(truthful or not) that is known to contradict it.
Following Baltag & Smets [9] we moreover define the following concept of ‘safe
belief’. In [48] Stalnaker calls it ‘absolutely robust belief’ in order to distinguish it
from the preceding concept of ‘relative robust belief’, while in [49] he uses it to
formally characterize Lehrer’s defeasibility analysis of knowledge [36]. We say that
agent i has the safe belief that ϕ, denoted by SBeliϕ, if and only if ϕ is true in all
worlds that i envisages and that are at least as plausible as the current world. In formal
terms, we define:
SBeliϕ
def
=
∧
h∈Num
(exci,h → [i](exci,≤h → ϕ))
with exci,≤h
def
=
∨
k∈Num:0≤k≤h exci,k. As the following Proposition 8 highlights, the
previous abbreviation correctly characterizes this notion of safe belief. Given a PDL-A
model M = 〈W, {Ei : i ∈ Agt}, κ,V 〉 and a world w in M, let SB i = {(w, v) : (w, v) ∈
Ei and κ(v, i) ≤ κ(w, i)} be the accessibility relation for agent i’s safe belief and let
SB i(w) = {v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ SB i} be the corresponding set of i’s SB i-accessible
worlds at world w.10
10Note that the relation SB i matches exactly to the plausibility relation in the pure qualitative accounts on
belief revision in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) [9, 51].
Proposition 8 For every PDL-A model M and for every world w in M, M,w |=
SBeliϕ if and only if M, v |= ϕ for all v ∈ SB i(w).
For notational convenience, we define ŜBeli to be the dual operator of SBeli, that is,
ŜBeliϕ
def
= ¬SBeli¬ϕ.
As the items (6a)–(6c) in the following Proposition 9 highlight, safe belief is
characterized by the normal modal logic system S4.3 which exactly corresponds to
Stalnaker’s logic S4.3 in his defeasibility analysis of knowledge [49]. The item (6d)
in Proposition 9 captures the characteristic property of safe belief: if ψ is an objec-
tive fact, agent i safely believes that ψ and ϕ is true then, after learning that ϕ, he
will continue to safely believe that ψ is true. In this sense, a safe belief is stable under
belief revision with any piece of true information.
Proposition 9 For every i ∈ Agt and for every α ∈ Num \ {0} we have:
|= SBeliϕ → ϕ (6a)
|= SBeliϕ → SBeliSBeliϕ (6b)
|=
(
ŜBeliϕ ∧ ŜBeliψ
)
→
(
ŜBeli
(
ϕ ∧ ŜBeliψ
)
∨ ŜBeli
(
ψ ∧ ŜBeliϕ
)) (6c)
|= (ϕ ∧ SBeliψ)→
[
∗αi ϕ
]
SBeliψ if ψ ∈ Obj (6d)
Note that, differently from knowledge, safe belief is not necessarily stable under
belief revision with false information. Indeed, SBeliψ →
[
∗αi ϕ
]
SBeliψ is invalid
even for ψ ∈ Obj.
4.2 Collective Attitudes
Given a PDL-A model M = 〈W, {Ei : i ∈ Agt}, κ,V 〉, let EJ =
⋃
i∈J Ei, BJ =
⋃
i∈J Bi
and SBJ =
⋃
i∈J SB i. We define a world v to be EJ-reachable from world w, denoted
by (w, v) ∈ E+J , if and only if there exist worlds w0, . . . ,wn such that w0 = w, wn = v
and for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n−1, there exists i ∈ J such that (wk,wk+1) ∈ Ei. In other words,
for every J ∈ 2Agt∗, E+J is the defined to be the transitive closure of EJ . Similarly, we
define B+J and SB
+
J to be the transitive closures of BJ and SBJ .
We define three types of collective attitudes that are interpreted by means of the
relations E+J , B
+
J and SB
+
J . The first two correspond to the well-known concepts
of common knowledge and common belief and are represented, respectively, by the
operators CKJ and CBelJ . The third one, represented by the operator CSBelJ , corre-
sponds to the concept of common safe belief that has been rather neglected in the
logical literature up to now.11 We define it here because we are interested in com-
paring it with the concepts of common knowledge and common belief, in the same
11The only exception is Baltag et al. [11] who study a notion of “common stable true belief” which similar
to our notion of “common safe belief”.
way as in Section 4.1 we compared safe belief with knowledge and belief. For all
J ∈ 2Agt∗ we define:
CKJϕ
def
=
[(⋃
i∈J
i
)∗]
ϕ
CBelJϕ
def
=
[(⋃
i∈J
(i; ?exci,0)
)∗]
ϕ
CSBelJϕ
def
=
[( ⋃
h∈Num,i∈J
(?exci,h; i; ?exci,≤h)
)∗]
ϕ
As the following proposition highlights, the preceding three abbreviations correctly
characterize the concepts of common knowledge, common belief and common safe
belief.
Proposition 10 For every PDL-A model M and for every world w in M:
• M,w |= CKJϕ if and only if M, v |= ϕ for all v such that (w, v) ∈ E+J ,
• M,w |= CBelJϕ if and only if M, v |= ϕ for all v such that (w, v) ∈ B+J ,
• M,w |= CSBelJϕ if and only if M, v |= ϕ for all v such that (w, v) ∈ SB+J .
The following Proposition 11 highlights the basic logical relationships between
common knowledge, common belief and common safe belief.
Proposition 11 For every J ∈ 2Agt∗ we have:
|= CKJϕ → CSBelJϕ (7a)
|= CSBelJϕ → CBelJϕ (7b)
According to the item (7a), J’s common knowledge that ϕ entails J’s common safe
belief that ϕ whereas, according to the item (7b), J’s common safe belief that ϕ entails
J’s common belief that ϕ.
Finally, the following Proposition 12 is about the dynamic properties of common
knowledge, common belief and common safe belief. Let
[∗Jϕ]ψ def=
[
∗
α1
i1 ϕ
]
. . .
[
∗
αcard(J)
icard(J) ϕ
]
ψ
where (i1, . . . , icard(J)) is any arbitrary ordering of the elements of J, and
α1, . . . , αcard(J) are any arbitrary values in Num \ {0}. The construction [∗Jϕ]ψ has
to be read “after every agent in J has learnt that ϕ is true, ψ will be true”.
Proposition 12 For every J ∈ 2Agt∗ we have:
|= CKJ
∧
i∈J
〈i〉ϕ → [∗Jϕ]CBelJϕ if ϕ ∈ Obj (8a)
|= CKJψ → [∗Jϕ]CKJψ if ψ ∈ Obj (8b)
|= (CSBelJϕ ∧ CSBelJψ)→ [∗Jϕ]CSBelJψ if ψ ∈ Obj (8c)
The item (8a) is the collective counterpart of the item (5a) of Proposition 7: if ϕ
is an objective fact and the agents in J have common knowledge that each of them
envisages a world in which ϕ is true then, after learning that ϕ is true, the agents in
J acquire the common belief that ϕ. This principle can be viewed as the collective
counterpart of the success postulate of AGM theory [1]. The item (8b) is the collec-
tive counterpart of the inertial principle for knowledge (Proposition 7, item 5c): if the
agents in J have common knowledge that the objective fact ψ is true then, after learn-
ing that ϕ, they will continue to have common knowledge that ψ . The item (8c) is the
collective counterpart of the inertial principle for safe belief (Proposition 9, item 6d):
if the agents in J have the common safe belief that the objective fact ψ is true and
that ϕ is true then, after learning that ϕ is true, they will continue to have the common
safe belief that ψ . In this sense, common safe belief is stable under belief revision
with any piece of information that the agents commonly and safely believe to be true.
5 Axiomatization and Decidability
In this section, we provide a complete axiomatization as well as a decidability result
for the logic PDL-A. This logic has so-called reduction axioms which allow us to
eliminate all the dynamic operators of belief revision from formulas. That elimination
provides a decidable procedure for checking whether a given formula is PDL-A valid.
Moreover it provides an axiomatics.
Let PDL-A− be the fragment of the logic PDL-A without the operators
[
∗αi ϕ
]
and
PDL-A−− be the fragment of PDL-A− without the special atoms exci,h. That is, let
the language of PDL-A− be the set of formulas defined by the following BNF:
ϕ ::= p | exci,h | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | [π ]ϕ
and let the language of PDL-A−− be the set of formulas defined by the following
BNF:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | [π ]ϕ
where p ranges over Prop, h ranges over Num, i ranges over Agt and π ranges over
the set of knowledge programs as defined in Section 3.1.
Proposition 13 The following formulas are PDL-A valid for all h, k ∈ Num and for
all i ∈ Agt.
〈i〉exci,0 (NormPlaus)
∨
h∈Num
exci,h (ComplPlaus)
exci,h → ¬exci,k if h = k (UniquePlaus)
Proposition 14 The following equivalences are PDL-A valid for all p ∈ Atm, h ∈
Num, α ∈ Num \ {0}, i, j ∈ Agt such that i = j:[
∗αi ϕ
]
p ↔ p (R1)
[
∗αi ϕ
]
exci,h ↔
((
ϕ ∧
∨
l,m∈Num\{0}:l−m=h
(
Belmi ¬ϕ ∧ exci,l
))
∨(
¬ϕ ∧ 〈i〉ϕ ∧
∨
l,m∈Num:Cut(α+l−m)=h
(
Belmi ϕ ∧ exci,l
))
∨([i]¬ϕ ∧ exci,h)
) (R2)
[
∗αi ϕ
]
excj,h ↔ excj,h (R3)
[
∗αi ϕ
]
¬ψ ↔ ¬
[
∗αi ϕ
]
ψ (R4)
[
∗αi ϕ
]
(ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ↔
([
∗αi ϕ
]
ψ1 ∧
[
∗αi ϕ
]
ψ2
) (R5)
[
∗αi ϕ
]
[π ]ψ ↔
[
F∗
α
i ϕ(π)
] [
∗αi ϕ
]
ψ (R6)
where for all j ∈ Agt:
F∗
α
i ϕ(j) = j
F∗
α
i ϕ(π1;π2) = F∗
α
i ϕ(π1);F∗
α
i ϕ(π2)
F∗
α
i ϕ(π1 ∪ π2) = F∗
α
i ϕ(π1) ∪ F∗
α
i ϕ(π2)
F∗
α
i ϕ(?ψ) = ?
[
∗αi ϕ
]
ψ
F∗
α
i ϕ(π∗) =
(
F∗
α
i ϕ(π)
)∗
As the rule of replacement of equivalents preserves validity, the equivalences
of Proposition 14 together with this allow to reduce every PDL-A formula to an
equivalent PDL-A− formula. Call red the mapping which iteratively applies the above
equivalences from the left to the right, starting from one of the innermost modal
operators. Red pushes the dynamic operators inside the formula, and finally
eliminates them when facing an atomic formula.
Proposition 15 Let ϕ be a formula in the language of PDL-A. Then
1. red(ϕ) has no dynamic operators [π ]
2. red(ϕ)↔ ϕ is PDL-A valid.
The first item of Proposition 15 is clear. The second item is proved using Proposition
14 and the rule of replacement of equivalents.
Theorem 1 Satisfiability in PDL-A is decidable.
Theorem 2 The validities of PDL-A are completely axiomatized by
• all principles of classical propositional logic
• axiomatization of PDL for the operators [π ]
([π]ϕ ∧ [π ](ϕ → ψ))→ [π ]ψ (K[π])
[π1;π2]ϕ ↔ [π1][π2]ϕ (Seq)
[π1 ∪ π2]ϕ ↔ [π1]ϕ ∧ [π2]ϕ (Choice)
[?ψ]ϕ ↔ (ψ → ϕ) (Test)
[π∗]ϕ ↔ (ϕ ∧ [π ][π∗]ϕ) (FixPoint)
(ϕ ∧ [π∗](ϕ → [π ]))→ [π∗]ϕ (Induction)
ϕ
[π ]ϕ
(Nec[π])
• axioms T, 4 and B for the epistemic operators [i]
[i]ϕ → ϕ (T[i])
[i]ϕ → [i][i]ϕ (4[i])
ϕ → [i]〈i〉ϕ (B[i])
• the schemas of Proposition 13
• the reduction axioms of Proposition 14
• rule of replacement of equivalents
ψ1 ↔ ψ2
ϕ ↔ ϕ[ψ1/ψ2]
(REP)
where ϕ[ψ1/ψ2] is the formula that results from ϕ by replacing zero or more
occurrences of ψ1, in ϕ, by ψ2.
6 Application to Game Theory
In this section we provide an application of the logic PDL-A to game theory. We first
introduce in Section 6.1 two important solution concepts of game theory: the pro-
cedure of Iterated Deletion of Strongly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS procedure),
and the procedure of n-rounds of Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies
followed by Iterated Deletion of Strongly Dominated Strategies (DWDSn-IDSDS
procedure). In Section 6.2 we provide an extension of the logic PDL-A with informa-
tion about agents’ behaviors (i.e., which strategy a given agent is currently playing).
We call PDL-A+ the resulting logic. In Section 6.4 the logic PDL-A+ is used to for-
mally characterize different forms of rationality which have been discussed in the
field of epistemic game theory: weak rationality, strong rationality and perfect ratio-
nality. Section 6.4 is the main contribution of this second part of the paper. Several
theorems about the epistemic characterization of IDSDS and DWDSn-IDSDS will be
provided. Proofs of these theorems are collected in a technical annex at the end of
the paper.
6.1 Iterated Weak and Strong Dominance
Let us first introduce the notion of normal form game.
Definition 5 (Normal form game) A normal form game is a tuple Ŵ = {{Si : i ∈
Agt}, {Ui : i ∈ Agt}} where:
• Si is agent i’s finite set of strategies;
• Ui :
∏
i∈Agt Si −→ R is agent i’s utility function assigning a real number
(the utility value for i) to every combination of agents’ actions (alias strategy
profiles).
For every agent i ∈ Agt, the elements of Si are denoted by symbols ai, bi, . . .
For every coalition J ∈ 2Agt∗, we define the set of strategies for the coalition
J to be SJ =
∏
i∈J Si. For notational convenience we write S instead of SAgt.
For every coalition J, elements of SJ are denoted by sJ, s′J, . . . For simplicity, ele-
ments of S are denoted by s, s′, . . . Given sJ ∈ SJ and i ∈ J, we note sJ[i]
the position of sJ corresponding to agent i. In what follows we write s ≤i s′
instead of Ui(s) ≤ Ui(s′) and s <i s′ instead of Ui(s) < Ui(s′) to mean
respectively that “the strategy profile s′ is for agent i at least as good as the strat-
egy profile s” and “the strategy profile s′ is for agent i better than the strategy
profile s”.
Definition 6 (Subgame) Given two games Ŵ = {{Si : i ∈ Agt}, {Ui : i ∈ Agt}} and
Ŵ′ = {{S′i : i ∈ Agt}, {U′i : i ∈ Agt}}, Ŵ′ is a subgame of Ŵ if and only if:
• for every i ∈ Agt, S′i ⊆ Si;
• for every i ∈ Agt, U′i = Ui|∏i∈Agt S′i where U′i is the restriction of Ui to the set of
strategy profiles
∏
i∈Agt S′i.
A strategy ai of a given player i is a strongly dominated strategy if and only if,
there exists another strategy bi of i such that, for all strategies s−i of the other players,
playing bi while the others play s−i is for i better than playing ai while the others
play s−i. An example of strongly dominated strategy is cooperation in the Prisoner
Dilemma (PD) game: whether the opponent chooses to cooperate or defect, defection
yields a higher payoff than cooperation. More formally:
Definition 7 (Strongly dominated strategies) Given a game Ŵ = {{Si : i ∈
Agt}, {Ui : i ∈ Agt}}, the set
SDŴi = {ai ∈ Si : ∃bi ∈ Si s.t. ∀s−i ∈ S−i, 〈ai, s−i〉 <i 〈bi, s−i〉}
is the set of strategies of player i that are strongly dominated in Ŵ.
A strategy ai of a given player i is a weakly dominated strategy if and only if, there
exists another strategy bi of i such that, for all strategies s−i of the others, playing bi
while the others play s−i is for i at least as good as playing ai while the others play
s−i and there is at least one strategy s′−i of the others such that playing bi while the
others play s′−i is for i better than playing ai while the others play s′−i. More formally:
Definition 8 (Weakly dominated strategies) Given a game Ŵ = {{Si : i ∈
Agt}, {Ui : i ∈ Agt}}, the set
WDŴi = {ai ∈ Si : ∃bi ∈ Si s.t. ∀s−i ∈ S−i, 〈ai, s−i〉 ≤i 〈bi, s−i〉 and
∃s′−i ∈ S−i s.t.〈ai, s′−i〉 <i 〈bi, s′−i〉}
is the set of strategies of player i that are weakly dominated in Ŵ.
The so-called Iterated Deletion of Strongly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS) (or
iterated strong dominance) is a procedure that starts with the original game Ŵ and,
at each step, for every player i removes from the game all i’s strongly dominated
strategies, thereby generating a subgame of the original game, and that repeats this
process again and again. The IDSDS procedure can be inductively defined as follows.
Definition 9 (IDSDS Procedure) Given a game Ŵ = {{Si : i ∈ Agt}, {Ui : i ∈ Agt}},
Iterated Deletion of Strongly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS) is the procedure defined
recursively as follows.
For all i ∈ Agt: let SIDSDSi,0 = Si and Ŵ
0 = Ŵ, for m ≥ 1, let SIDSDSi,m = S
IDSDS
i,m−1 \
SDŴ
m−1
i , where Ŵm−1 is the subgame of Ŵ with strategy sets S
IDSDS
i,m−1 .
For every m ≥ 0 and J ∈ 2Agt∗, let SIDSDSJ,m =
∏
i∈J SIDSDSi,m and let SIDSDSm = S
IDSDS
Agt,m .
Finally, let SIDSDSi =
⋂
m∈N SIDSDSi,m . For every J ∈ 2Agt∗, let S
IDSDS
J =
∏
i∈J SIDSDSi
and SIDSDS = SIDSDSAgt .
The procedure of n-rounds of Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies
followed by Iterated Deletion of Strongly Dominated Strategies (DWDSn-IDSDS) is
a procedure that starts with the original game Ŵ and, at each step, for every player
i removes from the game all i’s weakly dominated strategies thereby generating a
subgame of the original game, and that repeats this process for n rounds. Then, after
n rounds it applies Iterated Deletion of Strongly Dominated Strategies starting with
the game Ŵn. The DWDSn-IDSDS procedure can be inductively defined as follows.
Definition 10 (DWDSn-IDSDS Procedure) Given a game Ŵ = {{Si : i ∈
Agt}, {Ui : i ∈ Agt}}, n-iteration of Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies
(DWDSn) followed by Iterated Deletion of Strongly Dominated Strategies (IDSDS)
is the procedure defined recursively as follows.
For all i ∈ Agt: let SDWDS
n−IDSDS
i,0 = Si and Ŵ
0 = Ŵ, for 1 ≤ m ≤ n,
let SDWDS
n−IDSDS
i,m = S
DWDSn−IDSDS
i,m−1 \ WD
Ŵm−1
i , for m > n, let S
DWDSn−IDSDS
i,m =
SDWDS
n−IDSDS
i,m−1 \ SD
Ŵm−1
i , where Ŵm−1 is the subgame of Ŵ with strategy sets
SDWDS
n−IDSDS
i,m−1 .
For every m such that 0 ≤ m ≤ n and J ∈ 2Agt∗, let SDWDS
n−IDSDS
J,m =∏
i∈J S
DWDSn−IDSDS
i,m and SDWDS
n−IDSDS
m = S
DWDSn−IDSDS
Agt,m .
Finally, let SDWDS
n−IDSDS
i =
⋂
m∈N S
DWDSn−IDSDS
i,m . For every J ∈ 2
Agt∗
, let
SDWDS
n−IDSDS
J =
∏
i∈J S
DWDSn−IDSDS
i and SDWDS
n−IDSDS = SDWDS
n−IDSDS
Agt .
Note that, if n = 0, DWDSn-IDSDS is nothing but IDSDS. Moreover, if n = ∞,
DWDSn-IDSDS corresponds to the procedure of iterated admissibility or iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies [20, 23].
6.2 PDL-A with Information About Players’ Choices
The logic PDL-A is here extended with special constructions of the form pli(ai)whose
meaning is “agent i plays (or chooses) the strategy ai”. We call PDL-A+ the resulting
logic. For every J ∈ 2Agt∗, we define plJ(sJ) (“the agents in J play the collective
strategy sJ”) as follows:
plJ(sJ)
def
=
∧
i∈J
pli(sJ[i])
For simplicity, we write pl(s) instead of plAgt(s).
For every coalition of agents J ∈ 2Agt∗, we define the set BehJ of information
about J’s choices:
BehJ =
{∨
sJ∈sJ
plJ(sJ) : sJ ⊆ SJ
}
.
For example, the formula plJ(sJ) ∨ plJ(s′J) in BehJ means that “the agents in J play
either the collective strategy sJ or the collective strategy s′J”.
Definition 11 (PDL-A+ model) PDL-A+-models are tuples M′ = 〈M, {Ai : i ∈ Agt}〉
where:
• M is a PDL-A model;
• for every agent i, Ai : W −→ Si is a total function mapping each world w to the
strategy played by agent i at w.
Ai(w) = ai means that at w agent i plays the strategy ai.
Functions Ai are easily generalized to functions AJ : W −→ SJ , by postulating
that AJ(w) = sJ if and only if Ai(w) = sJ[i] for every i ∈ J.
Given a PDL-A+ model M and a world w, the truth condition of pli(ai) is:
M,w |= pli(ai) iff Ai(w) = ai
PDL-A+ models are assumed to satisfy the following two constraints. For every
w, v ∈ W, i ∈ Agt, ai ∈ Si and s−i ∈ S−i:
(Constr2) if Ai(w) = ai and (w, v) ∈ Ei then Ai(v) = ai;
(Constr3) there is u such that (w, u) ∈ Ei and A−i(u) = s−i.12
According to the Constraint (Constr2), an agent i chooses the strategy ai if and only
if he knows this. According to the Constraint (Constr3), for every strategy s−i of
the other players an agent i envisages a world in which this strategy is played. This
corresponds to the second requirement we have discussed in Section 2, namely the
assumption that the beliefs of the players are cautious.
The notions of validity and satisfiability in PDL-A+ are defined in the usual way.
For every PDL-A+ formula ϕ, we say that ϕ is valid, denoted again by |= ϕ, if ϕ is true
in all PDL-A+-models. We say that ϕ is satisfiable if ¬ϕ is not valid. We moreover
say that two PDL-A+ formulas ϕ and ψ are compatible, denoted by Comp(ϕ, ψ), if
ϕ ∧ ψ is satisfiable.
Note that the logic PDL-A+ is completely axiomatized by the axioms and rules of
inference of the logic PDL-A plus the following axiom schemas:∨
ai∈Si
pli(ai) (Active)
pli(ai)→ ¬pli(bi) if ai = bi (UniqueAct)
pli(ai)→ [i]pli(ai) (ActAware)
〈i〉pl−i(s−i) (PossStr)
The decidability of PDL-A+ follows straightforwardly from the decidability of PDL-
A and the fact that the set of axioms differentiating PDL-A+ from PDL-A is finite
(remember that every strategy set Si is assumed to be finite).
6.3 Variants of Rationality
The following formula characterizes a notion of weak rationality which is commonly
supposed in the epistemic analysis of games (see, e.g., [52]):
WRati(ai)
def
=
∧
bi =ai
⎛⎝ ∨
s−i∈S−i:〈bi,s−i〉≤i〈ai,s−i〉
B̂elipl−i(s−i)
⎞⎠
12Note that this constraint ensures that every function Ai is an onto function.
This means that the strategy ai is a weakly rational choice for the agent i, i.e.,
WRati(ai), if and only if, for every strategy bi different from ai, there exists a joint
strategy s−i of the other agents that he considers maximally plausible such that, play-
ing ai while the others play s−i is for agent i at least as good as playing bi while
the others play s−i. This means that weak rationality simply consists in not choosing
a strategy that is strongly dominated within the set of worlds that the agent consid-
ers maximally plausible. The following abbreviations WRati and AllWRatJ have to
be read respectively “agent i is weakly rational” and “all agents in the group J are
weakly rational”:
WRati
def
=
∨
ai∈Si
(pli(ai) ∧WRati(ai))
AllWRatJ
def
=
∧
i∈J
WRati
The preceding notion of weak rationality has been distinguished from a slightly
stronger notion of rationality, called strong rationality (see, e.g., [17]). The strategy
ai is a strongly rational choice for the agent i, i.e., SRati(ai), if and only if, for each
strategy bi different from ai either (1) there is a joint strategy s−i of the other agents
that i considers maximally plausible such that playing ai while the others play s−i
is for i better than playing bi while the others play s−i or (2) there is no joint strat-
egy s−i of the other agents that i considers maximally plausible such that playing bi
while the others play s−i is for i better than playing ai while the others play s−i. This
means that strong rationality simply consists in not choosing a strategy that is weakly
dominated within the set of worlds that the agent considers maximally plausible:
SRati(ai)
def
=
∧
bi =ai
⎛⎝⎛⎝ ∨
s−i∈S−i:〈bis−i〉<i〈ai,s−i〉
B̂elipl−i(s−i)
⎞⎠
∨
⎛⎝ ∧
s−i∈S−i:〈ai,s−i〉<i〈bi,s−i〉
Beli¬pl−i(s−i)
⎞⎠⎞⎠
The following abbreviations SRati and AllSRatJ have to be read respectively “agent i
is strongly rational” and “all agents in the group J are strongly rational”:
SRati
def
=
∨
ai∈Si
(pli(ai) ∧ SRati(ai))
AllSRatJ
def
=
∧
i∈J
SRati
Stalnaker has introduced an even stronger notion of rationality, called perfect ratio-
nality [47, 48]. Roughly, Stalnaker’s notion expresses that in cases two or more
actions maximize utility, the agent should consider, in choosing between them, how
he should act if he learned that he was in error. And if the two actions are still tied,
the agent considers how he should act if he learned that he was making an error
of a higher degree (see also [15]). We here consider a slightly different variant of
Stalnaker’s notion of perfect rationality that can be conceived as a lexicographic
refinement of the preceding concept of strong rationality. Our notion of perfect
rationality can be inductively defined by means of the preceding notion of strong
rationality and of the notion of graded belief introduced in Section 4.1. The basic idea
is the following. We say that the strategy ai is a strongly rational choice for the agent i
at level 1, denoted by SRat1i (ai), if and only if ai is a strongly rational choice accord-
ing to agent i’s current beliefs. This notion of level 1-strong rationality coincides with
the notion of strong rationality defined above. Moreover, for every h ∈ Num such that
1 < h ≤ max, we say that the strategy ai is a strongly rational choice for the agent i
at level h, denoted by SRathi (ai), if and only if:
• ai is a strongly rational choice for the agent i at level h− 1, and
• strategy ai is an admissible choice according to agent i’s graded beliefs with
strenght at least h,13 after having discarded all strategies bi different from ai that
are not strongly rational choices at level h− 1.
Finally, we say that the strategy ai is a perfectly rational choice for the agent i, denoted
by PRati(ai), if and only if:
• ai is a strongly rational choice for the agent i at level max, and
• strategy ai is an admissible choice according to agent i’s knowledge, after having
discarded all strategies bi different from ai that are not strongly rational choices
at level max.
In other words, ai is a perfectly rational choice for the agent i if and only if: ai is not
weakly dominated within the set of epistemic alternatives that i considers exceptional
with degree at most 0; and ai is not weakly dominated within the set of epistemic
alternatives that i considers exceptional with degree at most 1, after having discarded
all weakly dominated strategies within the set of epistemic alternatives that i consid-
ers exceptional with degree at most 0; and so on until level max. Formally speaking,
we define:
SRat1i (ai)
def
= SRati(ai)
for all h ∈ Num such that 1 < h ≤ max:
SRathi (ai)
def
= SRath−1i (ai) ∧
∧
bi =ai
⎛⎝SRath−1i (bi)→⎛⎝⎛⎝ ∨
s−i∈S−i:〈bi,s−i〉<i〈ai,s−i〉
B̂el
≥h
i pl−i(s−i)
⎞⎠
∨
⎛⎝ ∧
s−i∈S−i:〈ai,s−i〉<i〈bi,s−i〉
Bel
≥h
i ¬pl−i(s−i)
⎞⎠⎞⎠⎞⎠
13Remember from Section 4.1 that the graded belief operator Bel≥hi can be interpreted by means of the
binary relation B<hi = {(w, v) : (w, v) ∈ Ei and κ(v, i) < h}. Thus, strategy ai is an admissible choice
according to agent i’s graded beliefs with strenght at least h if and only if, strategy ai is a strongly rational
choice with respect to agent i’s set of envisaged worlds with exceptionality at most h− 1.
Finally:
PRati(ai)
def
= SRatmaxi (ai) ∧
∧
bi =ai
⎛⎝SRatmaxi (bi)→⎛⎝⎛⎝ ∨
s−i∈S−i:〈bi,s−i〉<i〈ai,s−i〉
〈i〉pl−i(s−i)
⎞⎠
∨
⎛⎝ ∧
s−i∈S−i:〈ai,s−i〉<i〈bi,s−i〉
[i]¬pl−i(s−i)
⎞⎠⎞⎠⎞⎠
The following abbreviations PRati and AllPRatJ have to be read respectively “agent i
is perfectly rational” and “all agents in the group J are perfectly rational”:
PRati
def
=
∨
ai∈Si
(pli(ai) ∧ PRati(ai))
AllPRatJ
def
=
∧
i∈J
PRati
The following Proposition 16 highlights the logical relationships between the three
notions of rationality (weak, strong and perfect).
Proposition 16 For every i ∈ Agt we have:
|= SRati → WRati (9a)
|= PRati → SRati (9b)
The following Proposition 17 is about properties of positive and negative introspec-
tion for the three forms of rationality. If an agent is/is not weakly/strongly/perfectly
rational then, he knows this.
Proposition 17 For every i ∈ Agt we have:
|= WRati → [i]WRati (10a)
|= SRati → [i]SRati (10b)
|= PRati → [i]PRati (10c)
|= ¬WRati → [i]¬WRati (10d)
|= ¬SRati → [i]¬SRati (10e)
|= ¬PRati → [i]¬PRati (10f)
6.4 Epistemic Conditions of Solution Concepts
The following Theorem 3 is the qualitative version of a probabilistic-based result of
Stalnaker [46] who has been the first to use probabilistic Kripke structures in order
to characterize the IDSDS procedure in terms of common belief of weak rationality
(see [16, 17] for some recent discussion of Stalnaker’s result). A similar result has
also been proved, with differing degrees of formality, by Bernheim [13], Pearce [40],
Brandenburger & Dekel [21], Tan & Werlang [50] and Lorini & Schwarzentruber
[37]. According to the Theorem 3, if the players have common belief that every agent
is weakly rational then the strategy profile which is played must survive IDSDS.
Theorem 3 Let s ∈ SIDSDS. Then:
|= CBelAgtAllWRatAgt → ¬pl(s)
According to the following Theorem 4, if the players have common belief that
every agent is perfectly rational, then the strategy profile which is played must sur-
vive one iteration of DWDS followed by IDSDS. This is called the Dekel-Fudenberg
procedure as it appeared for the first time in [24]. Characterizations of the epistemic
conditions of this solution concept have also been given in a probabilistic setting by
Stalnaker [47] as well as by Brandenburger [22] and Börgers [18].14
Theorem 4 Let s ∈ SDWDS1−IDSDS. Then:
|= CBelAgtAllPRatAgt → ¬pl(s)
According to the following Theorem 5, if the players have common belief that
every player (1) is perfectly rational and (2) has a robust belief that all other players
are perfectly rational relative to any compatible information about their choices, then
the strategy profile which is played must survive two iterations of DWDS followed
by IDSDS. A similar theorem has been stated before by Stalnaker [48], even though
he did not provide a formal proof for it. The main difference between Theorem 5 and
Stalnaker’s result is that Stalnaker’s analysis is given in quantitative setting based on
probabilities whereas the representation of uncertainty used here is semi-qualitative
(see Section 7 for further discussion).
Theorem 5 Let s ∈ SDWDS2−IDSDS. Then:
|= CBelAgt
(
AllPRatAgt ∧ AllRBelPRatAgt
)
→ ¬pl(s)
where for every J ∈ 2Agt∗:
AllRBelPRatJ
def
=
∧
i∈J
⎛⎜⎜⎝ ∧
χ−i∈Beh−i:
Comp(χ−i,AllPRat−i)
RBeli(χ−i,AllPRat−i)
⎞⎟⎟⎠
14Börgers’ characterization uses the concept of approximate common knowledge by Monderer & Samet
[39] instead of common belief. (Roughly speaking ϕ is approximate common knowledge if and only if,
everybody assigns high probability to ϕ, everybody assigns high probability to the fact that everybody
assigns high probability to ϕ, and so on).
AllRBelPRatJ has to be read “every player in J has a robust belief that all other
players are perfectly rational relative to any compatible information about their
choices”. It is worth noting that the hypothesis CBelAgt(AllPRatAgt ∧AllRBelPRatAgt)
of Theorem 5 requires that, for every player i ∈ Agt and for every strategy s−i of the
other players, if the strategy s−i is admissible (i.e., it is not weakly dominated) then
i envisages a world in which the other agents play the strategy s−i and they are all
perfectly rational. In particular, we have the following validity:15
|= CBelAgt(AllPRatAgt ∧ AllRBelPRatAgt)→∧
i∈Agt
∧
s−i∈S−i:s−i∈SDWDS
2−IDSDS
−i,1
〈i〉(pl−i(s−i) ∧ AllPRat−i)
Therefore, the model in which the formula CBelAgt(AllPRatAgt ∧ AllRBelPRatAgt)
is satisfied must be ‘sufficiently rich’, as for every player i and for every admissible
strategy of the other players there must be a world envisaged by i in which this strat-
egy is played and the other players are perfectly rational. This richness condition,
which is called by Brandenburger et al. [20, 23] the ‘completeness assumption’, has
been explicitly spelled out in [42, Definition 7.11, page 304].16
The preceding Theorem 5 can be generalized to n-iteration of deletion of weakly
dominated strategies. But before generalizing Theorem 5, we need to introduce the
concept of k-order robust belief about perfect rationality. For the case k = 1, we
define:
AllPRatRBelPRatJ,1
def
= AllPRatJ ∧ AllRBelPRatJ
and for all k > 1:
AllPRatRBelPRatJ,k
def
= AllPRatJ ∧
∧
i∈J
⎛⎜⎜⎝ ∧
χ−i∈Beh−i:
Comp(χ−i,AllPRatRBelPRat−i,k−1)
RBeli(χ−i,AllPRatRBelPRat−i,k−1)
⎞⎟⎟⎠
15This validity can be proved by using Proposition 2 given in the technical annex at the end of the paper
(Section A.3).
16It is worth noting that the completeness assumption together with the fact that there is common belief
that every player is perfectly rational and has a robust belief à la Baltag & Smets [10] (see Section 4.1)
about the perfect rationality of the other players are also sufficient conditions for two iterations of DWDS
followed by IDSDS. Indeed, in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 5, one can prove the following
validity for all s ∈ SDWDS2−IDSDS:
|=
⎛⎝ComplAss ∧ CBelAgt
⎛⎝AllPRatAgt ∧ ∧
i∈Agt
RBelB&Si AllPRat−i
⎞⎠⎞⎠→ ¬pl(s)
with
ComplAss
def
=
∧
i∈Agt
∧
s−i∈S−i:s−i∈SDWDS
2−IDSDS
−i,1
〈i〉(pl−i(s−i) ∧ AllPRat−i).
AllPRatRBelPRatJ,k has to be read “every player in J is perfectly rational and has
a k-order robust belief that all other players are perfectly rational relative to any
compatible information about their choices”.
According to the following Theorem 6, if the players have common belief that
every player is perfectly rational and has a k-order robust belief that all other players
are perfectly rational relative to any compatible information about their choices, then
the strategy profile which is played must survive k+ 1 iterations of DWDS followed
by IDSDS.
Theorem 6 Let s ∈ SDWDSk+1−IDSDS and k > 0. Then:
|= CBelAgtAllPRatRBelPRatAgt,k → ¬pl(s)
Note that, when k = 1, Theorem 6 and Theorem 5 coincide.
Before concluding, note that, because every Ai is a total function, the epistemic
conditions given in the antecedents of Theorems 3, 4, 5 and 6 are respectively suffi-
cient conditions of the equilibria IDSDS, DWDS1 − IDSDS, DWDS2 − IDSDS and
DWDSn − IDSDS. In particular,
|= CBelAgtAllWRatAgt →
∨
s∈SIDSDS
pl(s)
|= CBelAgtAllPRatAgt →
∨
s∈SDWDS1−IDSDS
pl(s)
|= CBelAgt(AllPRatAgt ∧ AllRBelPRatAgt)→
∨
s∈SDWDS2−IDSDS
pl(s)
|= CBelAgtAllPRatRBelPRatAgt,k →
∨
s∈SDWDSk+1−IDSDS
pl(s) for k > 0
7 Related Work
As pointed out in the introduction, the main difference between the present approach
and alternative epistemic characterizations of iterated weak dominance is that we
use a semi-qualitative approach to uncertainty based on the notion of plausibil-
ity introduced by Spohn [45], whereas existing epistemic analysis of iterated weak
dominance are based on a quantitative representation of uncertainty in terms of
probabilities. In this sense, the representation of uncertainty used in this paper is rel-
atively more simple than the representation of uncertainty used in other approaches.
For instance, in [47] Stalnaker presents a result similar to the preceding Theorem 4
whereas in [48] he discusses a result similar to the preceding Theorem 5. Differently
from the present approach, Stalnaker uses rich semantic structures combining prob-
ability measures over possible worlds, representing the uncertainty of players, with
plausibility orderings over epistemic alternatives, in order to model belief revision
policies.
Brandenburger et al. [23] (see also [20]) provide an epistemic characteriza-
tion of iterated admissibility where uncertainty is represented using lexicographic
probability systems (LPSs). An LPS assigns to every player a finite sequence
of probability measures (p1, . . . , pn) with non-overlapping supports. The proba-
bility p1 corresponds to a player’s initial hypothesis about the behavior of the
others, p2 corresponds to the player’s secondary hypothesis, and so on. The inter-
pretation given to this sequence of probability measure is that for any 1 ≤
k < n the hypothesis at level k is infinitely more likely than the hypothesis at
level k + 1. In their analysis of the epistemic conditions of iterated weak domi-
nance based on LPSs, Brandeburger et al. define a concept of ‘assumption’ that
is similar to the concept of robust belief used here and in Stalnaker’s analy-
sis. The idea is that a given player assumes that an event (or state of affairs)
ϕ is true if and only if, according to the player, ϕ is infinitely more likeky
than ¬ϕ.
In their logical characterization of iterated admissibility based on the concept of
“all the agents know” [31], Halpern & Pass [32] consider probability structures of the
form 〈
, s,F,PR1, . . . ,PRn〉, where Ŵ is a set of states, s is a function associating
each state in 
 to a strategy profile of a given game Ŵ, F is a 
-algebra over 
, and
for each player i in the game Ŵ, PRi associates with each state ω in 
 a probability
distribution PRi(ω) on (
,F).
Battigalli & Siniscalchi [12] analyze the epistemic conditions of the con-
cept of forward induction, that has been shown to be tightly related to
the concept of iterated admissibility. Their analysis is based on conditional
probability systems, a generalization of classical Bayesian probabilities that
allow them to model the update and/or the revision of the players’ beliefs,
in the course of an extensive game. The fundamental concept of Batti-
galli & Siniscalchi’s analysis is “strong belief” that is tightly related to
our and Stalnaker’s concept of “robust belief” and to Brandeburger et al.’s
concept of “assumption”. (See [3] for a comparison between these three
concepts).
A work that is similar in spirit to our approach is Baltag et al.’s analysis of the
epistemic conditions of backward induction based on a purely qualitative notion of
plausibility [11]. There are two main similarities between our approach and theirs.
First of all, we share with them the idea of analyzing the epistemic conditions of solu-
tion concepts by using a relatively simpler representation of uncertainty based either
on a purely qualitative approach or on a semi-qualitative one. Secondly, although
Baltag et al.’s analysis and our analysis are focused on two different solution con-
cepts, they employ a similar conceptual apparatus. For instance, Baltag et al.’s
characterization of the epistemic conditions of backward induction employs a con-
cept of “robust belief” that, as shown in Section 4.1, is closely connected to our
concept of “relative robust belief”.17
17Baltag et al.’s analysis too is largely inspired by Stalnaker [48].
8 Conclusive Remarks
In this paper we have developed a logical analysis of the epistemic conditions of
iterated weak dominance in a semi-qualitative framework based on Spohn’s theory of
uncertainty and belief change. One might wonder whether the same kind of analysis
could be made by using purely qualitative structures M = 〈W, {Ei : i ∈ Agt}, {i:
i ∈ Agt},V 〉 which result from replacing the plausibility grading function κ with a
family of total preorders i over possible worlds, where w i v means that v is for
agent i at least as plausible as w, and w ≡i v and w ≺i v mean respectively that
(w i v and v i w) and (w i v and v i w). Let us consider this issue in more
detail. Our analysis is mainly based on the notion of perfect rationality, as defined in
Section 6.4, which is based on the notion of graded belief when max > 1.18
In order to define the concept of graded belief, it is necessary to rank the pos-
sible worlds that an agent envisages according to their degree of exceptionality (or
plausibility) so that we can identify the set of worlds of rank 0, the set of worlds of
rank 1, the set of worlds of rank 2, and so on. The total preorder i over possible
worlds would be sufficient to make such a kind of ranking, as from a total order over
a set of elements we can build a corresponding ranking over the elements in that set.
Specifically, for all i ∈ Agt we could define:
Rank0i = {v ∈ W : ∃u ∈ Ei(v) such that v ≺i u}
and for all h ≥ 1:
Rankhi = {v ∈ W \
⋃
k<h
Rankki : ∃u ∈ Ei(v) \
⋃
k<h
Rankki such that v ≺i u}.
Given the preceding ranking over possible worlds, the plausibility grading function
κ is definable as follows: for all i ∈ Agt and for all w ∈ W, κ(w, i) = h if and only if
w ∈ Rankhi .
Thus, while in our semi-qualitative approach the plausibility ranking is directly
given by the function κ in the definition of a PDL-A model, in a purely qualitative
approach, such as the one presented in [9, 51], it would be induced by the plausibility
ordering i over the set of possible worlds.
Although from a semantic point of view, it seems clear that the same kind of
analysis could be made after replacing the plausibility grading function κ with a
family of total preorders i, it is not clear at all what the resulting logic would look
like. More generally, it is not clear how to build a decidable logic with a complete
axiomatization which is interpreted by means of purely qualitative structures of the
form M = 〈W, {Ei : i ∈ Agt}, {i: i ∈ Agt},V 〉 and which allows us to represent
in the object language the epistemic conditions of iterated weak dominance, namely
18Note that, when max = 1, the notion of perfectly rationality as defined in Section 6.4 and, consequently,
our analysis of the sufficient condition for iterated weak dominance only require the operators of knowl-
edge [i] and belief Beli. However, this does not mean that the graded belief operator Belhi is useless in
general. It only means that it becomes unnecessary in the binary case, i.e., when it is assumed that agents
rank possible worlds according to a two-value scale Num = {0, 1} for degrees of belief.
the concept common belief, the concept of robust belief about perfect rationality
and the concept of graded belief on which the definition of perfect rationality is
based. However, another important reason for choosing a semi-qualitative approach
to uncertainty rather than a purely qualitative one is that the graded belief operator
Belhi ϕ, on which our analysis of the epistemic foundation of iterated weak dominance
is based, is traditionally interpreted by means of the plausibility grading function κ
(see the seminal work by Spohn [45] and also [5, 35, 54]). It would be a non-standard
and unnatural choice to intrepret it via the total preorder i.
Another issue we intend to study in future research is a generalization of the
approach to belief change presented in Section 3.2. Due to space restrictions, we only
considered in this work an operation of belief change based on Spohn’s concept of
belief conditioning (Definition 4). We believe that our approach is flexible enough to
allow us to model or at least to approximate other kinds of belief revision operation
such as, e.g., the concepts of lexicographic upgrade and conservative upgrade in the
sense of [51].
Appendix: Some Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Satisfiability in PDL-A is decidable.
Proof First of all note that the logic PDL-A−− is nothing but the variant
of PDL where each atomic knowledge program i is interpreted by an equiv-
alence relation Ei. This logic can be embedded into PDL extended with con-
verse, by simulating every atomic knowledge programs i with a composite pro-
gram (a ∪ a−1)∗, where a is an arbitrary atomic program interpreted by a
binary relation Ra (not necessarily an equivalence relation!) and a−1 is the con-
verse of a. PDL with converse is decidable [33]. It follows that PDL-A−− is
decidable too.
Moreover, note that the problem of satisfiability in PDL-A− is reducible to the
problem of global logical consequence in PDL-A−−, where the special atoms exci,h
are just elements of the set of propositional variables Prop and the set of global
axioms Ŵ is the set of all formulas of Proposition 13. That is, we have |=PDL-A− ϕ
if and only if Ŵ |=PDL-A−− ϕ. Observe that Ŵ is finite (because Num is finite). It is
a routine task to verify that the problem of global logical consequence in PDL-A−−
with a finite number of global axioms is reducible to the problem of satisfiability in
PDL-A−−. In particular, if Ŵ = {χ1, . . . , χn}, we have Ŵ |=PDL-A−− ϕ if and only
if |=PDL-A−− CKAgt(χ1 ∧ . . . ∧ χn) → ϕ, where CKAgt is the common knowledge
operator defined in Section 4.2. As the problem of satisfiability checking in PDL-A−−
is decidable, it follows that the problem of satisfiability checking in the logic PDL-A−
is decidable too.
Proposition 15 ensures that red provides an effective procedure for reducing
a PDL-A formula ϕ into an equivalent PDL-A− formula red(ϕ). As PDL-A− is
decidable, PDL-A is decidable too.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Let s ∈ SDWDS1−IDSDS. Then:
|= CBelAgtAllPRatAgt → ¬pl(s)
Proof The proof is by induction.
Base case For all s ∈ SDWDS
1−IDSDS
1 we prove that:
(A1) |= CBelAgtAllPRatAgt → ¬pl(s)
To prove (A1), it is sufficient to prove the following validity (B1), as
CBelAgtAllPRatAgt → AllPRatAgt is valid by the item (10f) in Proposition 17.19 For
all s ∈ SDWDS
1−IDSDS
1 we have that:
(B1) |= AllPRatAgt → ¬pl(s)
And to prove (B1), it is sufficient to prove that if s[i] ∈ SDWDS1−IDSDSi,1 then:
(C1) |= PRati → ¬pli(s[i])
Let us prove (C1) by reductio ad absurdum. We assume that s[i] ∈ SDWDS1−IDSDSi,1
and M,w |= PRati and M,w |= pli(s[i]) for some arbitrary model M and world w in
M. We are going to show that these three facts are inconsistent. s[i] ∈ SDWDS
1−IDSDS
i,1
implies that:
(D1) there is bi ∈ Si such that: (1) for all s′−i ∈ S−i we have 〈s[i], s′−i〉 ≤i 〈bi, s′−i〉
and (2) there is s′′−i ∈ S−i such that 〈s[i], s′′−i〉 <i 〈bi, s′′−i〉.
M,w |= PRati and M,w |= pli(s[i]) together imply:
(E1) M,w |= PRati(s[i]).
By the Constraint (Constr3), (D1) implies that:
(F1) there is bi ∈ Si such that: (1) for all s′−i ∈ S−i we have 〈s[i], s′−i〉 ≤i 〈bi, s′−i〉
and (2) there are s′′−i ∈ S−i and u ∈ W and h ∈ Num such that (w, u) ∈ Ei and
A−i(u) = s
′′
−i and κ(u, i) = h and 〈s[i], s′−i〉 <i 〈bi, s′′−i〉.
(F1) implies that:
(G1) M,w |= PRati(s[i]).
But (G1) and (E1) are in contradiction.
Inductive case For m > 1, we assume that if s ∈ SDWDS1−IDSDSm then:
(Inductive Hypothesis) |= CBelAgtAllPRatAgt → ¬pl(s)
19Indeed, CBelAgtAllPRatAgt implies
∧
i∈Agt BeliPRati which in turn implies
∧
i∈Agt〈i〉PRati. The latter
implies
∧
i∈Agt PRati (by the validity (10f) in Proposition 17).
We are going to prove that if s ∈ SDWDS
1−IDSDS
m+1 then:
(A2) |= CBelAgtAllPRatAgt → ¬pl(s)
Let us take an arbitrary model M and world w and assume that M,w |=
CBelAgtAllPRatAgt and M,w |= pl(s). We are going to show that s ∈ SDWDS
1−IDSDS
m+1 .
From M,w |= CBelAgtAllPRatAgt, by the validity (10f) in Proposition 17, it follows
that:
(B2) M,w |= AllPRatAgt
By the validity (9b) in Proposition 16, (B2) implies that:
(C2) M,w |= AllSRatAgt
Moreover we have the following validity by the property |= CBelAgtϕ →
BeliCBelAgtϕ for every i ∈ Agt:
(D2) |= CBelAgtAllPRatAgt →
∧
i∈Agt BeliCBelAgtAllPRatAgt
Therefore, from M,w |= CBelAgtAllPRatAgt we infer that:
(E2) M,w |=∧i∈Agt BeliCBelAgtAllPRatAgt
By the inductive hypothesis, Axiom K and the rule of necessitation for the belief
operator Beli, from (E2) it follows that if s′ ∈ SDWDS1−IDSDSm then:
(F2) M,w |=∧i∈Agt Beli¬pl(s′)
From (F2), (C2) and M,w |= pl(s) it follows that for every i ∈ Agt and for all
bi ∈ Si either there is s′ ∈ SDWDS
1−IDSDS
m such that 〈bi, s′−i〉 <i 〈s[i], s′−i〉 or for all
s′ ∈ SDWDS1−IDSDSm we have 〈bi, s′−i〉 ≤i 〈s[i], s′−i〉. The latter implies that for every
i ∈ Agt we have s[i] ∈ SDWDS
1−IDSDS
i,m+1 which is equivalent to s ∈ S
DWDS1−IDSDS
m+1 .
A.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Let s ∈ SDWDS2−IDSDS. Then:
|= CBelAgt(AllPRatAgt ∧ AllRBelPRatAgt)→ ¬pl(s)
Proof The proof is by induction. The proof of the inductive case goes exactly as the
proof of the inductive case in the proof of Theorem 4.
Here we only prove the base case.
Base case For all s ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
2 we prove that:
(A) |= CBelAgt(AllPRatAgt ∧ AllRBelPRatAgt)→ ¬pl(s)
To prove (A), it is sufficient to prove the following validity (B), as
CBelAgt(AllPRatAgt ∧ AllRBelPRatAgt)→ (AllPRatAgt ∧ AllRBelPRatAgt) is valid.20
For all s ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
2 we have that:
(B) |= (AllPRatAgt ∧ AllRBelPRatAgt)→ ¬pl(s)
And to prove (B), it is sufficient to prove that if s[i] ∈ SDWDS2−IDSDSi,2 then:
(C) |= (PRati ∧
∧
χ−i∈Beh−i:Comp(χ−i,AllPRat−i) RBeli(χ−i,AllPRat−i))→ ¬pli(s[i])
Let us prove (C) by reductio ad absurdum. We assume that s[i] ∈ SDWDS2−IDSDSi,2
and M,w |= PRati and M,w |=
∧
χ−i∈Beh−i:Comp(χ−i,AllPRat−i) RBeli(χ−i,AllPRat−i)
and M,w |= pli(s[i]) for some arbitrary PDL-A+ model M = 〈W, {Ei : i ∈
Agt}, κ, {Ai : i ∈ Agt},V 〉 and world w in M. We are going to show that these three
facts are inconsistent.
The rest of the proof makes use of the following Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Let M = 〈W, {Ei : i ∈ Agt}, κ, {Ai : i ∈ Agt},V 〉 be a PDL-A+ model.
If M,w |= ∧χ−i∈Beh−i:Comp(χ−i,AllPRat−i) RBeli(χ−i,AllPRat−i) and s−i ∈
SDWDS
2−IDSDS
−i,1 and s
′
−i ∈ S
DWDS2−IDSDS
−i,1 then κw,i(pl−i(s−i))<κw,i(pl−i(s
′
−i)).
Proof In order to prove Lemma 1, we first prove the following Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 Let χ−i =
∨
s−i∈s−i
pl−i(s−i) for some s−i ⊆ S−i. Then,
Comp(χ−i,AllPRat−i) if and only if there exists s−i ∈ s−i such that s−i ∈
SDWDS
2−IDSDS
−i,1 .
Proof (⇐) We first prove the right-to-left direction of the equivalence, after assum-
ing that the set of strategy profiles is S = {s1, . . . , sn} for some n ∈ N. Suppose that
s−i ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
−i,1 with s−i ∈ s−i. We can exhibit the following PDL-A
+ model
M∗ = 〈W∗, {E∗i : i ∈ Agt}, κ
∗, {A∗i : i ∈ Agt},V
∗〉 where:
• W∗ = {w1, . . . ,wn};
• for all i ∈ Agt, E∗i = {(wh,wh′) : wh,wh′ ∈ W∗ and sh[i] = sh′[i]};
• for all wh ∈ W∗ and for all i ∈ Agt, A∗i (wh) = sh[i];
• for all i ∈ Agt and for all wh ∈ W∗, κ∗(wh, i) = 0;
• for all wh ∈ W∗, V ∗(wh) = Prop.
20Indeed, CBelAgt(AllPRatAgt ∧ AllRBelPRatAgt) implies that
∧
i∈Agt Beli(PRati ∧∧
χ−i∈Beh−i:Comp(χ−i,AllPRat−i) RBeli(χ−i,AllPRat−i)). The latter implies that
∧
i∈Agt PRati
(by the validity (10f) in Proposition 17). Moreover, it implies that∧
i∈Agt
∧
χ−i∈Beh−i:Comp(χ−i,AllPRat−i) RBeli(χ−i,AllPRat−i). To see this, just note that for any PDL-A
model M = 〈W,E, κ,V 〉, worlds w, v in M and α ∈ Num \ {0} we have that if v ∈ Bi(w) then
B
∗αi ϕ
i (w) = B
∗αi ϕ
i (v). Hence, we have |= Beli
[
∗αi ϕ
]
Beliψ → [∗
α
i ϕ]Beliψ . By the preceding validity and
the validity |= BeliBeliϕ → Beliϕ, we have |= BeliRBeli(ϕ, ψ) → RBeli(ϕ, ψ). Finally,
∧
i∈Agt(PRati ∧∧
χ−i∈Beh−i:Comp(χ−i,AllPRat−i) RBeli(χ−i,AllPRat−i)) is equivalent to AllPRatAgt ∧ AllRBelPRatAgt .
It is straightforward to verify that M∗,w∗ |= pl−i(s−i) ∧ AllPRat−i where w∗ is a
world in W∗ such that A∗−i(w∗) = s−i. Therefore, model M∗ satisfies pl−i(s−i) ∧
AllPRat−i. It follows that M∗ satisfies χ−i ∧ AllPRat−i too.
(⇒) The left-to-right direction of the equivalence can be proved by reductio ad
absurdum. We assume that: (1) s−i ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
−i,1 for all s−i ∈ s−i and (2)
there exists s′−i ∈ s−i such that M,w |= pl−i(s′−i) ∧ AllPRat−i for some PDL-A+
model M and world w in M. From the assumption (1), it follows that there is
j ∈ Agt \ {i} such that s′−i[j] ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
j,1 . From the definition of PRatj,
by the Constraint (Constr3) over PDL-A+ models, we can prove that if s′−i[j] ∈
SDWDS
2−IDSDS
j,1 and M,w |= plj(s
′
−i[j]) then M,w |= ¬PRatj. Hence, from the initial
assumptions it follows that M,w |= ¬PRatj. The latter is in contradiction with the
assumption (2).
Now assume that s−i ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
−i,1 and s
′
−i ∈ S
DWDS2−IDSDS
−i,1 . By Lemma
2, it follows that Comp(pl−i(s−i) ∨ pl−i(s′−i),AllPRat−i). Moreover, assume that
M,w |=
∧
χ−i∈Beh−i:Comp(χ−i,AllPRat−i) RBeli(χ−i,AllPRat−i). From the latter assump-
tion it follows that M,w |= RBeli(pl−i(s−i) ∨ pl−i(s′−i)AllPRat−i). Hence M,w |=
[∗αi pl−i(s−i)∨pl−i(s′−i)]Bel iAIIPRat−i for any α ∈ Num\{0}. By Lemma 2, from the
assumption s′−i ∈ S
DWDS2−IDSDS
−i,1 it follows that pl−i(s
′
−i)∧¬AllPRat−i is valid. By the
Constraint (Constr3) over PDL-A+ models and the truth condition of the belief revi-
sion operator [∗αi ϕ], it follows that M,w |= [∗
α
i pl−i(s−i)∨pl−i(s′−i)]Bel i(pl−i(s−i)∧
¬pl−i(s′−i)). The latter implies κw,i(pl−i(s−i)) < κw,i(pl−i(s′−i)). This completes the
proof of Lemma 1.
From M,w |=
∧
χ−i∈Beh−i:Comp(χ−i,AllPRat−i) RBeli(χ−i,AllPRat−i), by Lemma 1,
it follows that:
(D) if s′−i ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
−i,1 and s
′′
−i ∈ S
DWDS2−IDSDS
−i,1 then κw,i(pl−i(s
′
−i)) <
κw,i(pl−i(s′′−i)).
s[i] ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
i,2 implies that:
(E1) s[i] ∈ SDWDS2−IDSDSi,1 or
(E2) s[i] ∈ SDWDS2−IDSDSi,1 and s[i] ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
i,2
We split the proof in the two subcases: (E1) and (E2).
Proof for the Case (E1) s[i] ∈ SDWDS2−IDSDSi,1 implies that:
(F1) there is bi ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
i such that: (1) bi = s[i] and (2) 〈s[i], s′−i〉 <i
〈bi, s′−i〉 for some s′−i ∈ S
DWDS2−IDSDS
−i and (3) 〈s[i], s′′−i〉 ≤i 〈bi, s′′−i〉 for all
s′′−i ∈ S
DWDS2−IDSDS
−i .
From (F1) by the Constraint (Constr3) it follows that:
(G1) there are bi ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
i and s′−i ∈ S
DWDS2−IDSDS
−i and v ∈ W such
that: (1) bi = s[i] and (2) (w, v) ∈ Ei and (3) M, v |= pl−i(s′−i) and (4)
〈s[i], s′−i〉 <i 〈bi, s′−i〉 and (5) for all u ∈ W such that (w, u) ∈ Ei and for all
s′′−i ∈ S
DWDS2−IDSDS
−i : if M, u |= pl−i(s′′−i) then 〈s[i], s′′−i〉 ≤i 〈bi, s′′−i〉.
But (G1) is in contradiction with M,w |= PRati and M,w |= pli(s[i]).
Proof for the case (E2) (E2) implies that:
(F2) there is bi ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
i,1 such that: (1) bi = s[i] and (2) 〈s[i], s′−i〉 <i
〈bi, s′−i〉 for some s′−i ∈ S
DWDS2−IDSDS
−i,1 and (3) 〈s[i], s′−i〉 ≤i 〈bi, s′′−i〉 for all
s′′−i ∈ S
DWDS2−IDSDS
−i,1 .
By the Constraint (Constr3), (F2) together with M,w |= PRati and M,w |=
pli(s[i]) imply that:
(G2) there are s′−i ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
−i,1 and s
′′
−i ∈ S
DWDS2−IDSDS
−i,1 such that
κw,i(pl−i(s′−i)) ≤ κw,i(pl−i(s′′−i)).
But (G2) is in contradiction with (D).
A.4 Proof of Theorem 6
Let s ∈ SDWDSk+1−IDSDS and k > 0. Then:
|= CBelAgtAllPRatRBelPRatAgt,k → ¬pl(s)
Proof The proof is by induction. The proof of the inductive case goes exactly as the
proof of the inductive case in the proof of Theorem 4.
Here we only prove the base case.
Base case For all s ∈ SDWDS
k+1−IDSDS
k+1 we prove that:
(A1) |= CBelAgtAllPRatRBelPRatAgt,k → ¬pl(s)
To prove (A1), it is sufficient to prove the following validity (B1), as
CBelAgtAllPRatRBelPRatAgt,k → AllPRatRBelPRatAgt,k is valid (the proof of this
validity is similar to the one given in the proof of Theorem 5 for the validity
CBelAgtAllPRatAgt → AllPRatAgt).
For all s ∈ SDWDS
k+1−IDSDS
k+1 we have that:
(B1) |= AllPRatRBelPRatAgt,k → ¬pl(s)
We prove something more general than (B1), namely we prove that for all J ∈ 2Agt∗
and for all sJ ∈ SDWDS
k+1−IDSDS
J,k+1 :
(C1) |= AllPRatRBelPRatJ,k → ¬plJ(sJ)
The proof of (C1) is again by induction.
Base case For all sJ ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
J,2 we have to prove that:
(A2) |= (AllPRatJ ∧ AllRBelPRatJ)→ ¬plJ(sJ)
In the proof of Theorem 5 we have proved something stronger than (A2),
namely we have proved that if s[i] ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
i,2 then |= (PRati ∧∧
χ−i∈Beh−i:Comp(χ−i,AllPRat−i) RBeli(χ−i,AllPRat−i))→ ¬pli(s[i]).
Inductive case Let m be an integer such that m > 1. Let us assume that for all
J ∈ 2Agt∗, if sJ ∈ SDWDS
m−IDSDS
J,m then:
(Inductive Hypothesis) |= AllPRatRBelPRatJ,m−1 → ¬plJ(sJ)
We are going to prove that if sJ ∈ SDWDS
m+1−IDSDS
J,m+1 then:
(A3) |= AllPRatRBelPRatJ,m → ¬plJ(sJ)
The proof is by reduction ad absurdum. We take an arbitrary PDL-A+ model M
and a world w in M. We assume that M,w |= AllPRatRBelPRatJ,m and M,w |=
plJ(sJ) and sJ ∈ SDWDS
m+1−IDSDS
J,m+1 . We are going to show that these three facts are
inconsistent.
The rest of the proof is based on the following Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 Let m be an integer such that m > 1 and let χ−i =
∨
s−i∈s−i
pl−i(s−i) for
some s−i ⊆ S−i. Then, Comp(χ−i,AllPRatRBelPRat−i,m−1) if and only if there exists
s−i ∈ s−i such that s−i ∈ SDWDS
m−IDSDS
−i,m .
Proof of Sketch The proof of Lemma 3 is again by induction. We only prove the base
case (i.e., when m = 2).
(⇐) We first prove the right-to-left direction of the equivalence, after assuming
that the set of strategy profiles is S = {s1, . . . , sn} for some n ∈ N. Suppose that
s−i ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
−i,2 with s−i ∈ s−i. We can exhibit the following PDL-A
+ model
M∗ = 〈W∗, {E∗i : i ∈ Agt}, κ
∗, {A∗i : i ∈ Agt},V
∗〉 where:
• W∗ = {w1, . . . ,wn};
• for all i ∈ Agt, E∗i = {(wh,wh′) : wh,wh′ ∈ W∗ and sh[i] = sh′[i]};
• for all wh ∈ W∗ and for all i ∈ Agt, A∗i (wh) = sh[i];
• for all i ∈ Agt and for all wh ∈ W∗:
1. κ∗(wh, i) = 0 if and only if, for all j ∈ Agt \ {i}, sh[j] ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
j,1 ,
2. κ∗(wh, i) = max if and only if there is j ∈ Agt \ {i} such that sh[j] ∈
SDWDS
2−IDSDS
j,1 ;
• for all wh ∈ W∗, V ∗(wh) = Prop.
With the help of Lemma 2 in Section A.3, it is straightforward to ver-
ify that M∗,w∗ |= pl−i(s−i) ∧ AllPRat−i∧
∧
j∈Agt\{i}
(∧
χ−j∈Beh−j:
Comp(χ−j,AllPRat−j)
RBelj(χ−j,AllPRat−j)
)
where w∗ is a world in W∗ such that A∗−i(w∗) = s−i. There-
fore, model M∗ satisfies pl−i(s−i)∧AllPRatRBelPRat−i,1. It follows that M∗ satisfies
χ−i ∧ AllPRatRBelPRat−i,1 too.
(⇒) The left-to-right direction of the equivalence can be proved by reductio ad
absurdum. We assume that: (1) s−i ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
−i,2 for all s−i ∈ s−i and (2) there
exists s′−i ∈ s−i such that M,w |= pl−i(s′−i) ∧ AllPRat−i∧∧
j∈Agt\{i}(
∧
χ−j∈Beh−j:
Comp(χ−j,AllPRat−j)
RBelj(χ−j,AllPRat−j)) for some PDL-A+ model M
and world w in M. From the assumption (1), it follows that there is j ∈ Agt \
{i} such that s′−i[j] ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
j,2 . From the definition of PRatj(s
′
−i[j]), by
the Constraint (Constr3) over PDL-A+ models and with the help of Lemma 1
in Section A.3, we can prove that if s′−i[j] ∈ SDWDS
2−IDSDS
j,2 and M,w |=∧
χ−j∈Beh−j:
Comp(χ−j,AllPRat−j)
RBelj(χ−j,AllPRat−j) then M,w |= ¬PRatj(s′−i[j]). Therefore,
from the initial assumption that M,w |= pl−i(s′−i) it follows that M,w |= ¬PRatj.
The latter is in contradiction with the assumption (2), namely with M,w |= AllPRat−i.
M,w |= AllPRatRBelPRatJ,m is equivalent to:
(B3) M,w |= AllPRatJ ∧
∧
i∈J
∧
χ−i∈Beh−i:Comp(χ−i,AllPRatRBelPRat−i,m−1)
×RBeli(χ−i,AllPRatRBelPRat−i,m−1)
By inductive hypothesis, (B3) implies that for all s′′−i ∈ SDWDS
m−IDSDS
−i,m :
(C3) M,w |=∧i∈J ∧χ−i∈Beh−i:Comp
×(χ−i,AllPRatRBelPRat−i,m−1)RBeli(χ−i¬pl−i(s′′−i))
From (C3) and Lemma 3 it follows that for all i ∈ J:
(D3) if s−i′ ∈ SDWDS
m−IDSDS
−i,m and s−i′′ ∈ S
DWDSm−IDSDS
−i,m then
κw,i(pl−i(s−i′)) < κw,i(pl−i(s−i′′)).
(The proof of the preceding item (D3) is similar to the proof of the item (D) in the
proof of Theorem 5 in Section A.3).
The rest of the proof proceeds as the proof of Theorem 5 in Section A.3 (starting
from item (D)). For this reason, we do not repeat it here.
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